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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 ASSESSING TURKEY’S POSSIBLE ROLE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION’S 
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Over the years, the European Union has faced many problems, however, in recent years, 
an unprecedented flow of irregular immigrants has been on the agenda of the European 
Union. When the irregular immigrant crossings exceeded one million in 2015, the crisis 
has become a prioritized issue for the EU. Ever since that time, the Union tried to find 
many solutions to tackle the crisis. This thesis argues that the EU has dealt with its 
migratory pressures by outsourcing the solution to Turkey in which led to a cooperation 
between the EU and Turkey regarding the migration. This cooperation is shaped by 
Turkish policies and bargaining among member states. Therefore, this thesis will evaluate 
the EU level responses coming from the institutions, particularly focusing on the 
cooperation with Turkey emerged out of the migration crisis. By evaluating the EU level 
responses and the cooperation with Turkey, two grand theories are used which are 
neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. While the institutional outcomes are 
examined by the neofunctionalist arguments, the bargaining among the member states is 
evaluated by the liberal intergovernmentalism. The thesis provides empirical evidence 
from statements, progress reports, commission reports, UNHCR, EU data and many 
others in order to observe how a new form of cooperation emerged between EU and 
Turkey with regards to migration.  
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ'NİN GÖÇMEN KRİZİ'NDE TÜRKİYE'NIN MUHTEMEL 
ROLÜNÜN İNCELENMESI: 2014-2019 
 
 
 
DİLARA KAYA 
 
AVRUPA ÇALIŞMALARI YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, TEMMUZ 2019 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Türkiye, Göçmen krizi, İşbirliği 
 
 
Yıllar boyunca, Avrupa Birliği birçok sorunla karşı karşıya kaldı, fakat özellikle son 
yıllarda düzensiz mülteci geçişlerinin artmasıyla beraber mülteci krizi en önemli 
sorunlardan biri haline geldi. 2015 yılında bir milyon kişinin sınırı geçmesiyle, Birlik 
krizle baş etmek için birçok çözüm bulmaya çalıştı. Bu nedenle, tez Avrupa Birliği’nin 
karşılaştığı mülteci krizi sorununu, Türkiye’nin politikalars ve üye ülkeler arasında 
yapılan pazarlıklar sonucu oluşan işbirliği bağlamında incelemektedir. Türkiye ve AB 
arası işbirliğini incelemek adına, AB entegrasyon teorilerinden Yeni İşlevselcilik ve 
Liberal Hükümetlerarasıcılık açıklanmıştır. AB kurumlarının aldığı kararları Yeni 
İşlevselcilikle incelenirken, üye ülkeler arası pazarlıklar Liberal Hükümetlerarasıcılıkla 
açıklanmaktadır. Tezde, AB ile Türkiye arasında göç konusunda yeni bir işbirliği 
biçiminin nasıl ortaya çıktığını gözlemlemek için ifadelerden, ilerleme raporlarından, 
komisyon raporlarından, Birleşmiş Milletler Mülteciler Yüksek Komiserliği Bürosu 
verileri, AB verileri ve başka kaynaklardan faydalanılmaktadır.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Migration has become a phenomenon for many decades and especially, in recent years 
the problems caused by migration has been on the rise with the increase in civil wars, 
conflicts, wars, flows of people that were displaced from their home country or region. 
The crisis in the Middle East is an example of these problems. Ever since the Syrian Civil 
War erupted, the migration flows increased which caused serious problems regarding the 
protection and control of the borders. According to the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), currently, there are 41.3 million internally 
displaced person, 25.9 refugees and 3.5 asylum seeker (UNHCR 2019). Thus, this shows 
that the world has been going through a very serious crisis caused by problems related to 
migration in which consequences of the crisis has spread to the European continent, as 
well. 
 
Therefore, it is possible to say the European Union (EU) was one of the actors that has 
been most affected by the refugee flows coming from the sea and land routes. In 2015, 
the European Union faced an unprecedented problem in which the illegal crossings were 
over than a million (BBC 2015) and many of them were dying trying to crossing the sea. 
The tragedy at sea forced the European Union and its member states to take action to stop 
the flows and the deaths. In order to tackle the crisis, EU institutions gathered and tried 
to find solutions to the problems caused by irregular crossings in which many plans and 
suggestions were drafted and discussed. For a period of time, the migration crisis was the 
priority of the EU institutions in which some of the decisions taken showed different 
member state preferences, as well. An important outcome of the institutional decisions 
was the cooperation with Turkey in which led to the Joint Action Plan in 2015 and the 
EU-Turkey Statement in 2016. Therefore, with this cooperation, new solutions were 
found to secure the borders of the European Union.  
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This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter provides a theoretical 
framework in order to understand the crisis and its outcomes. Two grand theories of 
European integration are used in order to evaluate the crisis. Neofunctionalism and liberal 
intergovernmentalism are chosen because, while neofunctionalism looks at the 
developments in the institutional framework of the Union, liberal intergovernmentalism 
focuses on the member state interests. While neofunctionalism provides insights into 
policy harmonization in the EU, it fails short to provide a coherent assessment of the EU’s 
responses to the migration crisis faced in 2015. Liberal intergovernmentalism in contrast 
with its focus on member state preferences might provide different clues. The rational 
choices of the member states prevented to find a common Union response to the crisis, in 
which the EU could act effectively towards the flux of illegal immigrants. Therefore, not 
neofunctionalism but liberal intergovernmentalism might provide a more elaborate 
explanation on the causes of the EU member state actions for not accepting a response 
coming from the Union’s decision making process. Therefore, this thesis will look at the 
EU institutional level response for neofunctionalism and MS preferences with their 
primary declarations for liberal intergovernmentalism. In order to see if the liberal 
intergovernmentalist premises hold, the focus of the thesis will be on MS preferences 
towards the adoption of a common response to the challenges posed by 2015 migration 
crisis. The EU has dealt with its migratory pressures by outsourcing the solution to 
Turkey.  
 
Therefore, the argument of this thesis will be Turkey and the EU has a new form of 
cooperation for migration which is shaped by Turkish policies and bargaining among the 
member states. To observe this, this thesis will evaluate the cooperation between Turkey 
and the European Union. 
The second chapter focuses on the historical background of the crisis. Before evaluating 
this, the migration history of the Union, what are the tools of the EU for asylum policy 
and how they changed in time are examined. This is crucial to see what was the struggle 
of the EU when the crisis erupted. The policy tools were insufficient to control the flows, 
therefore, the historical development of the policies is examined for this purpose. Then, 
the origin of the crisis is elaborated to see what has happened in the beginning in which 
caused the EU to face such a crisis. After, the responses of the European Union are 
examined in order to see the decisions taken by the institutions and what were the 
reactions coming from the member states. The gatherings of the European Council, 
 3 
 
European Commission and the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Councils are observed 
what has EU tried to reach out for the sake of securing its borders.  
 
The third chapter is about cooperation with Turkey. The EU needed Turkey to secure its 
external borders. For this reason, this chapter, the cooperation with Turkey and how it 
affected the Union’s ability to cope with the migratory flows is examined under this 
chapter. Before explaining the foreign policy approach to Turkey, the foreign policy tools 
of the EU regarding the migration is evaluated. Then, a brief explanation of the 
Readmission Agreement (2013) is conducted in order to observe the previous framework 
of the relationship between the two. The Joint Action Plan and the EU-Turkey Statement 
and their content are evaluated, to see what kind of cooperation was conducted. The 
incentives that were offered Turkey and in exchange for what Turkey accepted are 
explained to evaluate the cooperation with Turkey. 
 
The fourth chapter examines the relations since the implementation of the EU-Turkey 
Statement. Under this chapter, the European Commission’s evaluation of Turkey's 
adoption of EU rules on migration is observed to see the framework of the relation 
between the EU and Turkey. Eurostat data, statements, progress reports and 
implementation reports on the EU-Turkey Statement are used to observe the EU 
evaluation of Turkey.  
 
Finally, the last chapter will look at the results of the cooperation after the Statement in 
order to see Turkey’s role in the migration crisis of the Union. UNHCR, Eurostat and 
other data conducted by the EU are used to see the part of Turkey. The illegal immigration 
data of the EU is examined briefly, then, the part of Turkey for accepting illegal 
immigrants and to cooperate with the EU to eliminate irregular crossings are evaluated.  
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
2.1.  Theoretical Framework 
 
 
"If Europe fails on the question of refugees, if this close link with universal civil rights is 
broken, then it won’t be the Europe we wished for." 
Angela Merkel 
 
The social context we are living is a complicated one. Therefore, explaining with theories 
help us to understand the context by enabling a more organized perception to evaluate. 
Since the European integration process has been a complicated and significant process, 
explaining this process in the light of different theories is crucial.  
 
The European integration process started in 1957 with the establishment of the European 
Economic Community (EEC), changed and evolved for approximately sixty years. Thus, 
using different theories and perceptions were necessary to understand the process. Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism are two competing theories of the European 
integration process. Both, neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism are referred 
as grand theories in which the purpose of this kind of exploration is to enable us 
understanding the factors underlying the integration process (Nugent 2017). They both 
attempt to explain the integration process of the European Community but focus on 
different aspects. According to neofunctionalists, the way that leads to integration is the 
“spillover effect” whereas liberal intergovernmentalism focuses on interstate bargainings 
and their results. Thus, the way they explain the issues with regards to the EU differs. For 
this, their perception of the migration challenges differs, as well. Liberal 
intergovernmentalism focuses on nation state bargains whereas neofunctionalism focuses 
on cooperation among societal actors (Hooghe and Marks 2019, 1114). 
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The unprecedented wave of migrants reaching crisis proportions in 2015, caused many 
problems for the European Union. While the number of irregular crossings was exceeding 
one million, the tragedy of deaths at sea was continuing. Thus, the Union tried to find a 
common solution to tackle the crisis. Therefore, the evaluation of this process with a 
theoretical framework is crucial to see what has been achieved regarding the solutions to 
the migration crisis and what could have not been achieved. Two important theories of 
the European Integration will be used to empirically test the EU responses to the 
migration crisis to see regarding the migration which is the neofunctionalism and the 
liberal intergovernmentalism. For this purpose, in this chapter, the content of these 
theories will be explained briefly, then examples relating to the migration developments 
will be explained. 
 
 
2.2.  Neofunctionalism 
 
 
Ernst Haas, one of the fathers of European integration theory, published his major work 
in 1958 Uniting of Europe, and formulated Neofunctionalism as one of the key theories 
to assess integration on the ground taking place in Europe. Neofunctionalism is a regional 
integration theory which takes the integration of European Communities as a case study 
to empirically test the theory.  
 
In the case of European integration, Ernst Haas emphasizes a high authority in which it 
will take the decisions on a supranational level. Neofunctionalism takes the “spillover 
effect” from Mitrany’s functionalism and demonstrates the conditions under which 
spillover works. Spillover as a concept refers to “creation and deepening of integration in 
one economic sector would create further pressures for further economic integration 
within and beyond that sector and greater authoritative capacity at the European level 
(Rosamond 2000).”  
According to Haas: 
 
“Neofunctionalism assumed that integration would proceed quasi-
automatically as demands for additional central services intensified because 
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the central institutions proved unable to satisfy the demands of their new 
clients. Thus, activities associated with sectors integrated initially would 
"spill over" into neighboring sectors not yet integrated, but now becoming the 
focus of demands for more integration (Haas 1968, xv).” 
 
Neofunctionalism suggested two types of spillovers which are functional and political. 
According to functional spillover effect, economic integration in one sector would 
produce pressures for integration in another sector (Nugent 2017). For instance, the 
process from the European Coal and Steel Community to the Economic and Monetary 
Union is an example of the functional spillover. In addition, some sectors had more 
spillover chance than others in which it had to meet the needs of people where low politics 
had more chance in comparison to high politics. But according to Haas, the spillover 
effect in economics necessitated “political activism”, in which required to be led to the 
right direction (Nugent 2017), which means “functional spillover” needed a “direction 
and coordination” from a higher authority, as well (Nugent 2017). The other type of 
spillover is political spillover. Political spillover suggested that national elites would give 
importance to supranational institutions and decision making process in which they 
supranational institutions and nongovernmental actors like political parties would become 
more influential in the decision making process whereas the nation states become less 
influential (Haas 1968). 
 
Loyalties is another explanation of the neofunctionalist theory in which required the 
loyalty transference for the political spillover to be completed. According to Haas, when 
the integration proceeds, values will change and redefined according to regional 
orientation rather than only national orientation. In the end, the process of integration will 
yield “new national consciousness of the new political community”. He suggested that 
when political actors are convinced to shift their loyalties to a supranational jurisdiction, 
then the political integration occurs: 
 
“Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct 
national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and 
political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand 
jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states (Rosamond 2000).” 
 
“Neofunctionalists identify a series of mutually reinforcing processes that lead to further 
integration.” These processes include spillover among policies in which they pave for a 
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way non-state actors to implement those with a shift towards supranationalism. Therefore, 
the interdependence would increase among those policies (Hooghe and Marks 2019, 
1116). The supranational actors would lead the policy spillover by signing agreements 
and by choosing the “national bureaucrats or interest group leaders (Hooghe and Marks 
2019, 1115).” 
 
A neofunctionalist would look into the developments on the institutional framework 
(Schmitter 2005). Until 2015, the migration policy of the EU was not challenged by illegal 
immigrants like the last three years numbers. Yet, when the influx of immigrants started 
to cause disturbance among member states, the absence of the migration policy was 
evident. A proposition that can be claimed is, under neofunctionalism, tied to the 
European institutions:   
Proposition 1: the European Institutions, in particular, the European Commission would 
act as a leader in proposing an EU level policy that would enable the EU to deal with 
migratory challenges.  
 
According to this theory, the main drivers of the integration are not member states but the 
European institutions and related political actors to these supranational institutions, in this 
case, it was expected that the institutions of the Union would act in a manner to speed up 
the integration.  
 
To explain the institutional actors' role in managing the migration crisis, on 22nd 
September 2015, an extraordinary JHA Council was gathered to discuss relocation of 
120,000 refugees which would be added to the 40.000 refugees relocation decision taken 
by the previous council was accepted with a majority of votes (EU2015LU 2015). For 
instance, Luxemburg Minister for Immigration and Asylum Jean Asselborn stated that 
"Some say that Europe is divided because a consensus decision was not reached. But, we 
are faced with an emergency situation! The EU stands accused of not reaching its 
decisions quickly enough". Also, First Vice-President of the European Commission Frans 
Timmermans, emphasized the significance of the decision to tackle border managements 
and identifying the asylum seekers and the return measure of the ones that are not granted 
international protection. He stated, “the aim is to prove to European civil society that "we 
are capable of making decisions, but also of "rebuilding trust" between the Member States 
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and showing solidarity (EU2015LU 2015).” But some declarations coming from EU 
officials show that a consensus would be more desirable for this kind of decision. This 
can be understood by the declaration of Luxembourg's Minister for Immigration and 
Asylum, "We would have preferred it to have been adopted by consensus, but we did not 
manage that. It was not for want of trying, I hasten to add" in which even the EU officials 
are aware of the fact that voting with unanimity for the plan would not have been 
accepted. 
 
Therefore, by the theoretical framework provided by neofunctionalism, EU level policies 
conducted by European Union institutions for migration will be examined in order to 
observe how the institutions dealt with the crisis caused by the flow of irregular 
immigrants. 
 
 
2.3.  Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
 
 
One of the most important grand theories of the European Integration is the Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism in which has been introduced by Andrew Moravcsik. According to 
Moravcsik, “European Integration resulted from a series of rational choices made by 
national leaders who consistently pursued economic interests.” He tests his argument by 
empirically looking at the negotiations of European integration history. Moravcsik 
analyzes the Rome Treaty, Customs Union and Common Agricultural Policy, European 
Monetary System, the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty. He developed his 
theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism by using a model of Two-Level Game theory to 
the process of European Integration. The two-level game theory claims the bargaining 
process does not only occur at the international level but also at the domestic level 
(Putnam 1988, 434), where Moravcsik used this to explain under what circumstances the 
European Integration occurs. According to the two-level game, the national actors 
emphasize both on international and domestic bargains in which at the national level, 
domestic groups, trade unions or interest groups pressure the government to pursue their 
interests in which politicians try to create coalitions with those groups in order to retain 
their power. At the international level, politicians try to keep the domestic groups satisfied 
and also try to limit the negative results of the foreign developments (Putnam 1988, 434).  
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Moravcsik’s theory to explain “assumption that states act rationally or instrumentally in 
pursuit of interests” are elaborated by dividing the European Community negotiations 
into three stages which are national preference formation, inter-state bargaining and the 
choice of national institutions (Moravcsik 1998). Regarding the national preferences 
stage, he states that preferences reflect the domestic groups within a state (Moravcsik 
1998) in which influences international bargaining. He divides national preferences into 
two categories which are geopolitical interests and ideology where the focus is on the 
security and it focuses on indirect results of the economic consequences. However, the 
second category is the political economic interests in which examines the direct 
consequences of the economic integration (Moravcsik 1998).  
 
According to Liberal Intergovernmentalism, - the relative power among different socio 
political groups at the domestic level and their bargaining lead to a national preference 
which is then used at the international negotiations table. To be more specific, Moravcsik 
focuses on the treaty negotiations between states which are the bargaining games. The 
domestic preferences of a country “defines a bargaining space” of possible agreements. 
Then, the third one which is the institutional choice asks when and why states pool their 
sovereignty to a supranational institution. According to Moravcsik sovereignty is 
delegated when supranational actors like the European Commission takes autonomous 
decisions where a state cannot use a unilateral veto. Another proposition that can be 
claimed for the purpose of this thesis is this: 
 
Proposition 2: Member states have a major role in shaping the EU level responses to the 
major crisis, such as migration. The absence of a lowest common denominator among the 
MS towards the migration challenge is the main reason behind the lack of a common 
policy.  
 
In the following paragraphs, these are explained detailly by giving examples from the 
migration crisis of the European Union. Contrary to the neofunctionalism, Moravcsik 
emphasizes the relative power of the member states and their national interests. He 
claimed that neofunctionalism failed because the process of community building starts 
and evolves through a series of intergovernmental bargains (Moravsik 1993) which shows 
unlike neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism focuses on the member state 
preferences where they control the process. Member state preferences are the main actors 
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that shape the developments within the European Union. Combining realist and liberal 
arguments, Moravcsik develops intergovernmentalism and explains the linkages between 
domestic politics and international politics by using the two-level game (Putnam 1988). 
National states interests play a vital role in an issue to be adopted at the EU level because 
domestic interests are more critical for member state preferences. The rationality of states 
is crucial for accepting a policy area in which they would not let if the socio-political 
interests do not converge with the international bargaining (Rosamond 2000). In addition, 
the integration moves further if the core three states within the EU accepts the process to 
continue, which are Germany, the United Kingdom, and France (Moravcsik 1998). If the 
domestic political preferences and interests of those states crash, then a policy or a 
decision cannot be adopted. The Single European Act example is given by Moravcsik to 
show how the three member state preferences affected European economic integration. 
For instance, while he explains the 1960s, he emphasizes that all three favored global 
tariff liberalization in which enabled a process of negotiation for that period (Moravcsik 
1998). 
 
Liberal intergovernmentalism emphasizes the domestic preferences and explains the 
integration with the member state choices. If any resolution to be achieved it needs to be 
set by intergovernmental bargaining, yet in the case of tackling with crisis bargaining 
mostly resulted in divergent ideas which the integration could not move any further. 
National governments have an incentive to co-operate when their control over policy 
coordination is high. For this reason, a concrete uniform response could not be achieved 
and what has been achieved was not enough to tackle the refugee crisis (Moravcsik 1998).  
 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism emphasizes the interstate bargaining in which claiming that 
major agenda-setting decisions in the history of the European Community are negotiated 
intergovernmentally (Moravcsik 1998). Since migration is an area where nation-state 
preferences play a vital role due to high politics issues, coming up with a common 
response is highly difficult. Liberal intergovernmentalism focuses on the relations 
between the state and society which claims that the nation-states are rational actors that 
their preferences are related to liberal values, and this theory aims to analyze interstate 
bargaining (Moravcsik 1998), therefore if the desires of the member states differ, then 
reaching out a common solution becomes harder. The identity of important societal 
groups affects the foreign policy of a state. In the situation of migration, this is the key. 
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Unless foreign policy choices on migration within the EU converges then reaching a 
common solution is not possible, since domestic actors and preferences are key factors, 
and they seem to differ. 
 
One of the aspects of the liberal intergovernmentalism is the two-level game in which 
bargaining process does not only occur at the international level but also at the domestic 
level, as well. States bring domestic bargaining, interest groups desire, declarations that 
could affect their votes at the member state level to the international table (Putnam 1988, 
434). Acceptance at the domestic level is crucial for states which is one of the components 
of the two-level game. To give an example to domestic bargaining, Interior Minister of 
Germany, Horst Seehofer who is a more proposed securing German borders and limiting 
the migrants, however, Merkel was not in favor of this because it would harm the Union 
in which the burden would fall on the frontier states like Italy and Greece. However, 
Merkel had to adopt the border camps for asylum seekers and to tighten the border with 
Austria to save the government to secure the CDU/CSU1 coalition in Germany. When the 
bargaining could not have been able to reach at the domestic table, the negotiation that is 
discussed at the international table was only limited. Ever since 2015, reaching a common 
policy to the migrant crisis had bumped into many obstacles.  
 
Referring to the liberal intergovernmentalism, there is also a tripartite explanation 
(Schimmelfennig 2018, 1580) of the policy adaptation in which the consensus of 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and France are necessary. Moravcsik claims that major 
historical points in the history of the European Union were possible only because these 
three member states were on board to move to the next step. To understand the complexity 
of the European Union, assessing the preferences of three member states is crucial. Even 
the states like Poland, Hungary Luxemburg would have accepted to harmonize their 
policies, unless there is the motivation of the big three to proceed, integration cannot 
move forward.  
 
Regarding the three big states, the migration policy driver within the Union was only 
Germany. Especially, the United Kingdom was not a part of finding a common solution 
which is no surprise when we consider the anti-European Union rhetoric in the country. 
                                                 
1 This is the ruling coalition in Germany in which Angela Merkel was the leader of Christian Democratic Union until 
November 2018, Horst Seehofer is the leader of Christian Social Democrats. 
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The United Kingdom was not a part of migration policy since Tony Blair who was the 
former Prime Minister of UK opted-out in 1997, whereas current Prime Minister of UK 
Theresa May showed no different response to help the refugee crisis, as well. During a 
speech in 2015, she said that “not in a thousand years” would she take part in a new 
common immigration policy (Travis 2017). Even, it seems like French responses to the 
refugee crisis are better than the United Kingdom, there are some problematic issues as 
well. During the June of 2018, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President 
Emmanuel Macron called for a joint response to the European Union's immigration 
challenge (RFP/RL 2018), yet a couple of months ago France reassessed its agreement 
related to the coastal borders with the United Kingdom to secure borders from the illegal 
immigrants (McAuley and Booth, 2018). Based on liberal intergovernmentalist logic, the 
reason why there is no concrete consensus regarding the migration policy is that three 
critical member states are not sharing the same idea as they did during the Single 
European Act or Maastricht Treaty. Domestic preferences and state-society relations are 
more important for France and the United Kingdom then responding to the refugee crisis 
and helping people. 
 
European responses are shaped by the lack of a unified voice on migration at EU level, 
domestic opposition in multiple member states, mostly from the three big member states 
which are the United Kingdom, Germany and France. Domestic level opposition in large 
member states and Central Eastern member states have acted as a barrier to the EU’s 
response. For these reasons, this theory explains why there has not been a solid EU level 
response to deal with the refugee crisis. Governments weight the costs and benefits and 
delegate their sovereignty if only shifting increases the bargaining efficiency (Moravcsik 
1993). Therefore, especially for a high politics area like migration, shifting their loyalties 
neither increase efficiency nor affects political support positively they gain from the 
citizens. 
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3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE MIGRATION CRISIS: AN 
EVALUATION OF THE EU’S RESPONSE 
 
 
 
In 2015, the European Union confronted an unprecedented wave of migrants reaching 
crisis proportions. The Migration Crisis reached its peak point in 2015 with the number 
of refugees and migrants crossing Europe was more than one million according to IOM 
International Organization for Migration) numbers. The tragedy of the migration crisis 
has become more visible when over 600 people drowned in the Mediterranean near 
Libyan waters in April 2015 (UNHCR 2015). After the accident, the European Union 
decided to take action immediately where they tried to “mobilise all efforts to prevent 
more people from dying at sea” (EUROPA 2015). Yet, the failure of the burden sharing 
of the refugee crisis between member states caused problems for the Union. The European 
Union has tried to find many solutions to cope with the migrant crisis, yet, there was not 
a common concrete response among many attempts suggested by the Union. 
 
The borders of the Union have been threatened by the flux of immigrants. To understand 
the danger of the Union has been faced, the migration history of the EU will be evaluated 
by giving examples from history.  This is crucial to see why the flux of immigrants has 
become a threat to the borders of the European Union. After, the origin and numbers of 
the refugees will be evaluated briefly to show the danger of the crisis. Lastly, the reaction 
of the Union will be evaluated by examining the decisions, reactions, European Council 
and Justice and Home Affairs gatherings of the European Union. This is critical to see the 
rational behavior behind the member states in which caused the lack of response of the 
Union which pushed cooperation with Turkey.  
 
 
3.1. Migration History of the European Union 
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Ever since the European Economic Community (EEC) was established in 1957 with the 
Rome Treaty, one of the primary goals was to eliminate the barriers for four fundamental 
freedoms which are the free movement of goods, services, capital and people. Part I, 
Article 3/c is the provision mentions this aim:  
 
“For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Community shall 
include, as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable set 
out therein; 
(c) the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of 
movement for persons, services and capital (EUROPA 2018)” 
 
Therefore, today the Schengen Area is another step that was taken to achieve the aim to 
remove external borders between its members. At the moment, there are twenty-six 
members of the Schengen Area whom four of them are not members of the Union. 
However, before reaching out the decision for Schengen Zone, the Union has some 
history of migration cooperation previous to 1980s. Before explaining the Schengen Area, 
it is crucial to examine some historical moments regarding the migration history of the 
Union. 
 
After the signature of the Rome Treaty, migration deals were mostly bilateral agreements 
that increased after the rapid industrialization following the Second World War.  
Migration and who enters which any European country has been under the control of the 
member states in which there was no common migration policy. The bilateral agreements 
that were signed at that period contained topics like “transportation of workers, exchange 
of manpower for industrial resources and rules for the length of stay (Seilonen 2016, 20)” 
which indicates that motives behind migration were different at that period in comparison 
to the recent crisis of the Union. Between the period of 1950-1974, flows of migrations 
were considered beneficial for the labor need of the individual member states coming 
from countries like Morocco, Turkey, Portugal and Tunisia. (Van Mol and De Valk 2016, 
32). The member state interests played a vital role in the signature of the bilateral 
agreements which would be in benefit of the EEC. By the time the oil crisis started in 
1973 and affected the economy of Europe severely, the migration policy direction of the 
member states changed, as well. In comparison to the previous period of receiving 
refugees for the labor market, the need for labors diminished due to the economic 
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problems caused by the crisis. The member states stopped to receive migrants for the 
labor market (Van Mol and De Valk 2016, 38). Another period started with the 1980s in 
which the Union started to emerge an immigration policy (Van Mol and De Valk 2016, 
51). In 1985, the European Commission issued “the Commission presented a 
communication called Guidelines for a Community policy on migration” in which ideas 
like European citizenship (Seilonen 2016, 8) became more evident comparing to past 
policies.  
 
Another critical point from the EU agreements was the Single European Act (SEA) in 
1986 and came into force in 1987 in which contained an article regarding the removal of 
barriers for the internal market: 
 
“The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in 
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured 
in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty (LEX EUROPA 2019)” 
 
After the signature of the SEA, eliminating internal borders necessitated strengthening 
the external borders. The reasoning for this was that if the internal borders are eliminated, 
then controlling “of the European Community to guarantee a sufficient level of control of 
who and what can legitimately enter the space of free movement” was necessary 
(Huysmans 2000, 759). In 1985, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Luxemburg and 
Germany signed the agreement where they agreed on the gradual elimination of their 
border checks (EUROPA 2019). In 1990, Convention implementing the Schengen 
Agreement signed by those five countries and in 1995 the Agreement came into force 
(EUROPA 2019). According to Chapter II/Article 2 of the Agreement, “Internal borders 
may be crossed at any point without any checks on persons being carried out” and also 
other issues like visas and residence permits were discussed among those five countries 
(LEX EUROPA, 2019).  
 
Considering the steps towards a common policy, Dublin Regulation, Maastricht Treaty 
and Amsterdam Treaty which were signed in the 1990s had critical references to the 
migration policy of the Union. To observe how these are the steps towards the adoption 
of a common policy on migration, their content regarding the migration will be examined. 
Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992 which was one of the milestones of the European 
Integration process. This treaty changed the structure of the European Union and created 
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the three-pillar structure which were the Community Pillar, Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). The Community Pillar’s 
aim was to “make the single market work and to promote, among other things, a 
harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities” (EUROPA 
2019). The CFSP pillar aimed to define a common foreign and security policy by 
intergovernmental decisions. The JHA pillar, which was an intergovernmental pillar, was 
the most critical pillar regarding the migration policy aimed to establish certain rules. The 
Title VI/Article K.1 stated:  
 
“For the purposes of achieving the objectives of the Union, in particular the 
free movement of persons, and 'without prejudice to the powers -of the 
European Community, Member States shall regard the following areas 
matters of matters of common interest (EUROPA 2019).” 
 
These “common interest” areas were “rules and the exercise of controls on crossing the 
Community’s external borders; combating terrorism, serious crime, drug trafficking and 
international fraud; judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters; creation of a 
European Police Office (Europol) with a system for exchanging information between 
national police forces; controlling illegal immigration; common asylum policy (EUROPA 
2019).” By creating another pillar, member states tried to secure themselves against the 
uncontrolled flow of immigrants.  
 
The Dublin Regulation (1997) regulated the asylum policy of the Union in which where 
the third country citizen entered the Union, that country would have to control the asylum 
seeker. Also, in the 2000s the Dublin Regulations were readopted by Dublin II (2003) 
and Dublin III (2014) to face the challenges of asylum policy. The Dublin II Regulation 
adapted the criteria “only one Member State is responsible for examining an asylum 
application. The objective is to avoid asylum seekers from being sent from one country 
to another, and also to prevent abuse of the system by the submission of several 
applications for asylum by one person.” among other policies to tackle with asylum 
problems (LEX EUROPA 2011). According to Dublin Regulations, “asylum seeker" 
means a third country national who has made an application for asylum in respect of 
which a final decision has not yet been taken (LEX EUROPA 2011)”. 
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Dublin III Regulation which was one of the final regulations adopted before the migration 
crisis of the Union amended the previous Dublin Regulations adding the Article 33 “A 
mechanism for early warning, preparedness and crisis management and a variety of 
measures aimed at improving the rights of the asylum applicants (LEX EUROPA 2013)” 
to widen the scope of the asylum policy. The aim of the Dublin Regulation is to determine 
which member state has the responsibility for the asylum applications. Chapter III/Article 
7 states: 
 
“The Member State responsible in accordance with the criteria set out in this 
Chapter shall be determined on the basis of the situation obtaining when the 
applicant first lodged his or her application for international protection with 
a Member State (LEX EUROPA 2013).” 
 
Also, under Chapter III and Chapter IV, family regulations, dependent people, visa 
regulations, and rules for minors were determined in which expanded the scope of the 
Dublin Regulations (LEX EUROPA 2013). The aim of this regulation was to have a 
common asylum policy to tackle the applications and it is binding for the member states 
of the European Union. 
 
The Amsterdam Treaty was signed in 1997 and came into force in 1999. The Amsterdam 
Treaty expanded and defined rules for asylum seekers and for migratory issues, as well 
(EUROPA 2019). One of the amendments made by the Amsterdam Treaty was this:  
 
“to maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and 
justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with 
appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, 
immigration and the prevention and combating of crime (EUROPA 2019)” 
 
Another critical development introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam was the 
incorporation of the Schengen to the structure of the Union which was stated by Article 
K.12/5: 
 
“This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of the Protocol integrating 
the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union (EUROPA 
2019).” 
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Followed by the Amsterdam Treaty, the Tampere Programme of 1999 was another crucial 
milestone which aimed to create the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, showed the 
importance given to control immigrant flows and also to protect the external borders of 
the Union for the benefit of member states. Under the decisions of this program, 
importance was given to partnership with origin countries, establishing a common asylum 
system, management of migration flows and equal treatment to the third country nationals 
(EUROPA 1999). Especially, decisions regarding the establishment of a common asylum 
policy were crucial to maintain and secure the Union. One of the conclusions of the 
Programme stated that:  
 
“System should include, in the short term, a clear and workable determination 
of the State responsible for the examination of an asylum application, 
common standards for a fair and efficient asylum procedure, common 
minimum conditions of reception of asylum seekers, and the approximation 
of rules on the recognition and content of the refugee status (EUROPA 
1999).” 
 
Tampere was a crucial turning point for which its specific importance is given to the 
freedom, security and justice. As can be seen, the Union was trying to establish and 
maintain a “common policy” to tackle security problems.  
 
Another crucial date was 2004 which The Hague Programme was decided by the 
European Council. This programme’s focus was also on the area of justice, freedom and 
security in which set ten priorities regarding this area. One of the priorities was the 
external dimension of immigration and asylum in which contained provisions regarding 
the cooperation with third countries and transit countries and return and readmission 
policy of the migrants. Another priority set was the control of migration flows which 
emphasized on border controls and fight against illegal immigrants which stated tools like 
biometric data and visa rules to deal with illegal immigrants (LEX EUROPA 2005). The 
priorities set by the programme was explained detailly in which indicates the increased 
importance that was given to reach a common policy. 
 
The initiation of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), The Global Approach 
to Migration and Mobility2 and the Lisbon Treaty3 were critical junctures for the 
                                                 
2 This will be further evaluated under the Chapter 3. 
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migration policy of the Union. European Commission’s Policy Plan on Asylum that was 
introduced in 2008, which based on the previous framework and enhanced the policies of 
the Union for the asylum policy. Like the other treaties of the Union, the CEAS was based 
on Geneva Convention in which recognizes the principle of non-reofoulement.4 
 
The CEAS is based on the EU treaties and secondary legislations like Dublin Regulations, 
Eurodac Regulation or Qualification Directive and other EU policies. The plan would be 
legalized with the Lisbon Treaty coming into force. To give an example from the 
revisions, for instance, this plan revised Asylum Procedures Directive to become fairer 
and quicker and stated “setting up of a single, common asylum procedure leaving no 
space for the proliferation of disparate procedural arrangements in the Member States”. 
This indicates that the Union was trying to push forward a more effective common asylum 
policy in which would secure the EU. Also, the plan emphasized equal sharing between 
member states which states it was the Union’s responsibility to find a common response 
to the countries who have the disadvantage of the geographical position (LEX EUROPA 
2008).  
 
The Lisbon Treaty was signed in 2007 and came into force in 2009. Lisbon Treaty 
eliminated the pillar system of the Union which was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty. 
With the Lisbon Treaty, objectives like a uniform status of asylum, a uniform status of 
subsidiary protection, a common system of temporary protection became a common 
policy for member states. The Lisbon Treaty aimed to create a more common policy 
regarding immigration which can be seen from Chapter 1/Article 61 of the Treaty: 
 
 “It shall ensure the absence of internal border controls for persons and shall 
frame a common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control, 
based on solidarity between Member States, which is fair towards third-
country nationals. For the purpose of this Title, stateless persons shall be 
treated as third-country nationals (LEX EUROPA 2017).” 
 
All of the new changes and adaptations were planned in order to have a common 
migration policy in which would benefit the Union to tackle with problems regarding this 
issue. Yet, when those are examined it can be said when the migration crisis of the Union 
                                                 
4 It prohibits states from transferring or removing individuals from their jurisdiction or effective control when there is 
evidence that person may be in danger for his or her life. 
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started in 2015 these regulations were not effective enough and they were insufficient to 
control the migratory flows. Therefore, especially after 2015 EU tried to find many 
solutions yet failed to respond with a common policy towards the crisis which indicated 
that diverging member state preferences were still at the core of regulations like migration 
or asylum system which caused many problems among member states.  
 
 
3.2. Origin of the 2015 Migration Crisis 
 
 
Migration is currently an important issue area affecting multiple countries and regions in 
recent years. European Union is affected by the consequences of the migration crisis 
harshly. The Migration Crisis reached its peak point in 2015 with the number of refugees 
and migrants crossing Europe was more than one million according to International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) numbers. By the end of October 2015, approximately 
1. 2 million of illegal border-crossings were reported (European Parliamentary Research 
Service Blog 2015) and it was calculated by the IOM that 5,350 migrants died at the sea 
in 2015 (IOM 2017). 
 
The tragedy at the sea was severe. In April 2015 with the sinking ship in the Libyan Sea 
which necessitated a response by the European countries. The number of immigrants was 
coming from the Mediterranean Route to the Italy shores in which some member states 
accepted to receive some of the refugees in order to help Italy and Greece. To show the 
severity of the crisis, statistical data should be mentioned to see what the European Union 
tried to deal with. The migrants on their way to the EU came from multiple different 
regions and countries, from the Middle East, Africa and South Asia. On the one hand, the 
Syrians composed the largest group applying for asylum, which was followed by 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Most of the refugees were using sea routes where they used Greece 
as a transit route. The asylum applications were mostly directed towards Germany, 
following by Hungary, Sweden, Austria, and Italy (BBC, 2016). Also, the accidents 
occurring at the Mediterranean Sea in which many refugees died led the European Union 
to take certain actions. According to Eurostat data EU protected 333.350 asylum seekers 
in 2015, which was increased by 72% compared to 2014 data, these figures show that the 
crisis EU was going through was crucial. The accepted asylum seekers were mostly from 
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Syria, followed by Eritrea and Iraq (EUROSTAT 2016). In 2016, 1.2 million asylum 
seekers applied to the EU (EUROSTAT 2018), whereas this number was 1.3 in 2015. In 
2017, this number decreases to approximately 650.000 (EUROSTAT 2018) and in the 
second quarter of 2018, the number is close to 136.000.  
 
Table 3.1 Asylum Applications (non-EU) to the European Union 2008-2018 (Eurostat 
2018) 
 
 
According to Eurostat, in 2015 there were 2.2 million illegally present people in the EU 
whereas this number decreased to 617.000 in 2017 (EUROSTAT 2018). To show the 
magnitude of the crisis, asylum applications and illegal crossing are added between the 
years 2014-2018. Especially in 2015 and 2016, the unprecedented number of applications 
and crossing show that the European Union had to face a very serious crisis. 
 
Table 3.2 Illegal Border Crossings 2014-2018 (Eurostat 2018) 
Illegal Border 
Crossings 
Western 
Mediterranean 
Route 
Central 
Mediterranean Western 
Balkan Route 
Eastern 
Mediterr
anean 
Route Route 
2014 7243 170664 43357 50834 
2015 7004 153946 764033 885386 
2016 9990 181376 130325 182277 
2017 23063 118962 12179 42319 
2018 57034 23485 5869 56561 
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The crisis affected the EU harshly and it had serious consequences over the policies of 
the Union. The deaths were increasing, the flow of refugees could not have been stopped 
and member states were causing problems for not accepting the refugees and closing their 
borders. The EU has faced one of the most serious crisis throughout its history in which 
caused many problems among member states. Therefore, the next section will focus on 
the reactions of the member states and the EU decisions to observe the severity of the 
crisis. 
 
 
3.3. The Reaction of the European Union: Meetings, Councils and the Decisions 
Taken 
 
 
Ever since the 2015 migration crisis, the Union has developed certain coping mechanisms 
and tools to deal with the flux of immigrants. Since the EU is composed of twenty-eight 
member states, the reactions or the capacity of the Union to deal with the crisis depends 
on a consensus and a unified response, but this did not seem to be the case. Normally, the 
EU institutions prepare a Recommendation and the recommendation needs to be accepted 
via unanimity in the Council for the decisions related to migration. Unlike the decisions 
taken for the internal market, migration is an area where unanimity is still the main 
decision making process. But, neither EU member states nor the EU institutions were able 
to formulate a coherent solution to deal with the migration crisis. This is why it is crucial 
to evaluate how this crisis started, how did the member states react, which member states 
were affected most as well as the formulations of European Union level responses. 
 
On April 23, 2015, a Special Meeting of the European Council Brussels was conducted 
to find solutions to the migration crisis. The European Union declared that their 
immediate priority was to prevent the deaths at the sea and also added the four main areas 
which are strengthening their presence at sea, fighting traffickers, preventing illegal 
migratory flows, reinforcing internal solidarity and responsibility. In addition to these, it 
asked the Commission to prepare a European Agenda on Migration which was adopted 
on 13 May 2015 which explained a comprehensive way to tackle the crisis. In the first 
part of the Agenda, the immediate action is explained in which the measures the EU 
should take in response to death at sea, targeting smugglers, relocation and resettlement 
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system and cooperation with third parties and a hotspot approach. Institutional setups 
were enhanced like Europol, European External Action Service and Frontex. The budget 
of Frontex to increase was suggested in order to save the lives at sea. Also, an additional 
50 million EUR were suggested (EUROPA 2015) to distribute for the resettlement 
system. Within this report, a temporary relocation and resettlement system was 
recommended on the basis of population, GDP, asylum applications and the number of 
refugees in those states and lastly the unemployment rate. 40.000 of refugees would be 
relocated in accordance with these terms. According to these rates, Germany would be 
the most to receive refugees, France, Italy, and Spain are the next ones respectively. 
 
Table 3.3 European Resettlement Scheme (Europa 2015) 
Member States   
 
                    Key Total allocation based on 
20.000 persons 
Austria 2,22% 444 
Belgium 2,45% 490 
Bulgaria 1,08% 216 
Croatia 1.58% 315 
Cyprus 0,34% 69 
Czech Republic 2,63% 525 
Denmark 1,73% 345 
Estonia 1,63% 326 
Finland 1,46% 293 
France 11,87% 2375 
Germany 15,43% 3086 
Greece 1,61% 323 
Hungary 1,53% 307 
Ireland 1,36% 272 
Italy 9,94% 1989 
Latvia 1,10% 220 
Lithuania 1,03% 207 
Luxembourg 0,74% 147 
Malta 0,60% 121 
Netherlands 3,66% 732 
Poland 4,81% 962 
Portugal 3,52% 704 
Romania 3,29% 657 
Slovakia 1,60% 319 
Slovenia 1,03% 207 
Spain 7,75% 1549 
Sweden 2,46% 491 
United Kingdom 11,54% 2309 
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Cooperation with the third countries (EUROPA 2015) is another crucial part of the 
European Agenda on Migration which we see in the example of the agreement between 
EU and Turkey that will be signed.  In order to deal with migratory pressures, hotspot 
action was established. The “hotspots are facilities set up at the EU’s external border in 
Greece and Italy for the initial reception, identification and registration of asylum seekers 
and other migrants coming to the EU by sea (EUROPA 2019).” This would require 
common work of EU Agencies and the member states to register new coming refugees. 
The hotspot approach required the work of Europol, European Asylum Support Office 
and Frontex to work together with member states for identifying the data of the migrants 
like their fingerprints and their registration (EUROPA 2019). 
 
In comparison to 23th of April 2015 Special Meeting of the European Council 
declarations, European Agenda on Migration is highly detailed regarding the measures 
the EU will implement in which the Agenda contained a long-term “coherent and 
comprehensive approach” that the EU should act for the crises caused by the migratory 
flows. The second part of the Agenda emphasized that the existing system to control 
migration was insufficient in which a more effective policy was needed. The Agenda 
stated the EU should be: 
 
“Engaging beyond its borders and strengthen cooperation with its global 
partners, address root causes, and promote modalities of legal migration that 
foster circular growth and development in the countries of origin and 
destination (EUROPA 2019)” 
  
This part suggested how the EU should deal with this crisis by explaining four measures 
which are reducing the incentives for irregular migration, saving lives and securing the 
external borders, a strong asylum policy, a new policy on legal migration (EUROPA 
2015). Regarding reducing incentives, relations with transit and origin countries would 
be enhanced by taking measures like giving more importance to EU delegations in foreign 
countries. Also, the return system of the irregular migrants would be enhanced by 
increasing cooperation with third countries. Considering the secure borders aim, the 
operations and role of Frontex would be increased in addition to initiatives like Smart 
Borders which was increasing the efficiency of border crossing and controlling the illegal 
crossings. For the third one which was a stronger common asylum system, strengthening 
the CEAS and implementing a new monitoring system were suggested. Lastly, the legal 
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migration part suggested enhancing already existing systems of the EU and also focusing 
on the effective integration of member states for better migration policy.5  
 
On 15th and 16th of June 2015, the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council met to discuss 
the aspects of the agenda on migration. The JHA Council deals with the problems of the 
Union regarding migration, therefore especially after the 2015 Crisis, the decisions 
discussed by the Council became more visible. During the June Council, it was stated that 
while European Union Internal Security Strategy 2015-2020 is being implemented the 
migration agenda would be taken into consideration as well (EUROPA 2015). The June 
Council adapted “The EU Internal Security Strategy for the period 2015-2020” for the 
security threats the Union has been facing with. This document prioritized terrorism, 
cybercrime and organized crime. Also, there is a focus on the border management in 
which stated under the Strategy that “Preventive action against the facilitation of irregular 
migration requires better information gathering, sharing and analysis. The key lies in 
cooperation against the smuggling of migrants inside the EU and with third countries 
(EUROPA 2015)” to secure the borders of the European Union. In addition, there is a 
focus on human trafficking in which those priorities are related to problems caused by the 
migration crisis (EUROPA 2015).  
 
The JHA Council conducted on 14th of September 2015 provides a crucial turning point, 
the topics that discuss were related to Greece and Italy. Since Italy and Greece are the 
ones dealing with new refugees because of their location, the Council decided upon new 
regulations to control. Greece would receive monetary help from the Union and the 
decision taken by the July Council which was 40.000 refugees located in Greece and Italy 
were to be relocated among member states would become operational. Another important 
context of this Council was the emphasis given to the cooperation with Turkey. It was 
stated that meetings with Turkey will continue to deal with the refugee crisis. Also, 
support for the Western Balkans was to be increased to deal with the migrants (EUROPA 
2015). 
  
                                                 
5 Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHA) is one of the configurations of the Council of European Union. The Justice 
and Home Affairs ministers of EU member states deal with issues of freedom, security and justice area of the Union in 
which related to migration, border management, police cooperation and judicial cooperation in both civil and criminal 
law among others. 
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On 22nd September 2015, an extraordinary JHA Council was gathered to discuss 
relocation of 120,000 refugees which would be added to the 40.000 refugees relocation 
decision taken by the previous council was accepted with a majority of votes (EUROPA 
2015). On September 23, heads of government were gathered and declared their desire to 
European Commission to find new solutions for the migration crisis (EUROPA 2015), 
especially it is important to highlight that they emphasized the meetings with Jordan, 
Turkey and Lebanon for dealing the crisis. The JHA Council gathered on the 8-9th of 
October, also emphasized the return of the refugees. The tools of return policy were 
introduced during this Council (EUROPA 2015). 
 
On the 11-12th of November 2015, the Valletta Summit was conducted between European 
and African heads of state to discuss migration. According to the conclusions of the 
Summit, respond to migration is “guided by the principles of solidarity, partnership and 
shared responsibility (EUROPA 2015)” which shows that EU was trying to cooperate 
with third countries to stop the flows of migrants. During this Summit, both sides 
discussed and decided on how to tackle the migration flows coming to the EU. An 
Emergency Trust Fund was created to address reasons for irregular migration. This 
summit contained a Political Declaration and an Action Plan. To tackle the migration 
crisis, the Action Plan emphasized on five priorities which were “addressing root causes 
of irregular migration and forced displacement, legal migration and mobility; protection 
and asylum; prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and 
trafficking in human beings; cooperation for return, readmission and reintegration of 
irregular migrants (EUROPA 2015)”. The aim was mostly to deal with the migration 
flows at its origin in order to stop the death at sea and to protect the borders of the 
European Union. 
 
While the year 2015 ending, the meetings with Turkey and the European Union increased 
in which the Union had considered Turkey as a crucial partner for dealing with its refugee 
crisis. At the gathering conducted on the 29th of November Ahmet Davutoğlu (Prime 
Minister of Turkey at that time) was representing Turkey and a Joint Action Plan was 
adopted to eliminate the refugee crisis.6  
 
                                                 
6 Cooperation with Turkey will be further evaluated in the following chapters. 
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On July 13th, 2016 European Union reformed the Common European Asylum System to 
tackle the refugee problem since the previous measures7 the EU has taken were not 
sufficient to solve the crisis. It was declared that the aim of the European Commission is 
“to move towards a fully efficient, fair and humane asylum policy” in comparison to past. 
The adopted proposal was comprehensive and consisted topics like shortened period of 
the asylum process, guarantees for asylum seekers and also different regulations for the 
refugees like setting common rules for them, the five-year rule for a long-term residence 
for a refugee (EUROPA 2016). This proposal would help to conduct with the Dublin 
regulations better because the refugees were trying to pass through the registration and 
this was creating an unbalance among the refugee numbers.  
 
On October 6th, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency was established to secure 
external borders of the Union. In March 2017, informal Summit was conducted in Malta 
where the main concern was the immigrants coming to EU from Libya. Also, within this 
declaration, it is possible to see that there would be the cooperation of IOM and UNHCR 
to deal with illegal immigrants from Libya (EUROPA 2017). In the following JHA 
Councils and other institutional meetings, migration consisted of an important part as 
well. The oncoming gathering tried to establish a decent policy for migration but still, it 
became insufficient because not all the member states agreed on the same solutions. For 
instance, the JHA Council of June 2018 touches upon the migration problem but only on 
the surface. Provisions related to migration topic of this Council was “engaging with 
Turkey to ensure the commitments under the EU-Turkey statement continue to be 
respected – stepping up support to EU agencies, in particular Frontex, EASO and Europol 
– ensuring sufficient and timely funding to the EU Trust Fund for Africa, to keep up EU 
efforts on the Central and Western Mediterranean routes – supporting partners along the 
Western Balkans in stemming the flows in the region (EUROPA 2018).” 
 
Many European states said that they do not want to receive refugees which they object to 
the policies of the Union. For instance, Austria, Poland, and Italy threatened to close their 
borders to immigrants unlike the desire of Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany. When 
the politics in Germany is observed during the summer of 2018 Merkel was left alone for 
                                                 
7 Under normal circumstances, the Dublin System under the CEAS required the member state to accept the applicant 
the firs place that the applicant has been registred. But this caused problems for the frontier states regarding the flow 
of immigrants. 
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the EU decisions to implement because of the political threats of limiting the coalition 
(Bennhold 2018). 
  
When we generally observe the implications, meetings, and achievements of the EU, it is 
not possible to say that they reached a common policy. The solutions that were established 
are too general and a unified resolution cannot be found in order to deal with the refugee 
problem. All of the oppositions by EU member state leaders show that finding an EU 
level response to tackle the crisis is not easy where it looks like finding a common solution 
in the future is not going to be easy, either.  
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4. SECURING THE BORDERS: TURKEY AS A BUFFER ZONE 
 
 
 
The migration crisis has been one of the most significant problems that the European 
Union has faced in recent years. One of the external crisis EU has been struggling with, 
has been the unprecedented number of refugees coming to the EU borders (Müftüler-Baç 
2017), in which EU tried to find many solutions yet failed to build a common policy 
among its member states. Especially in 2015 with the escalation of the crisis, this number 
has passed one million illegal immigrants. Ever since the migration crisis erupted in the 
continent, Heads of governments, European institutions and leaders are trying to find a 
concrete solution, but they failed to do so until now. The Justice and Home Affairs 
Councils, leaders or other EU institutions failed to solve the migration flows by finding a 
solution internally. Member states of the European Union pursue different interests 
regarding the migration crisis for their identity, domestic politics or their geographical 
location.  
 
To show the member state reluctances it is necessary to explain some actions of the EU 
member states. The JHA Council of 20th of July 2015 had more comprehensive in 
comparison to the previous councils because of its content in terms of resettling and 
relocation of the migrants (EUROPA 2015). Not all member states were on board with 
the resettlement plan, the Central and Eastern European countries most vocally in 
opposition. However, these resolutions did not satisfy all the member states of the EU in 
which some of them did not want to receive refugees declared by the quotas explained 
and they were unwilling to contribute to the immigration problem. During the summer of 
2015, member states like Poland and Slovakia declared that they would only want to 
receive Christian refugees. Slovakian Interior Minister stated that “In Slovakia, we have 
a really tiny community of Muslim people. We even don't have mosques. That's the reason 
we want to choose people who really want to start a new life in Slovakia. And Slovakia, 
as a Christian country, can really help Christians from Syria to find a new home in 
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Slovakia” in which shows the unwillingness of Slovakia (Rettman 2015). Also, Czech 
Republic stated the same desire as well. The President of the Czech Republic stated, 
“refugees from a completely different cultural background would not be in a good 
position in the Czech Republic”. Prime Minister of Poland also reluctant to receive 
Muslim refugees in which stated: “as a Christian country, has a special responsibility to 
help Christians (Rettman 2015)”. A declaration by Poland was that if the refugees they 
receive are not Christians then this situation could threaten Poland because ISIS can locate 
their troops to Poland. Hungary declared they would build a wired fence and control the 
border strictly because of the new coming refugees. Also, the Netherlands introduced spot 
checks on the border of Germany (Eddy and Bilefsky 2015). The Hungarian Prime 
Minister Viktor Orbán declared in 2015 that they would take the EU to the ECJ because 
of the quota distribution system was decided by a Qualified Majority Voting (QMV)8. 
Orbán stated that “The quota system for distributing asylum seekers was decided without 
respect for public opinion, and this could cause a “democracy crisis” in Europe” (Schalit, 
2015). Hungary was one of the states who rejected this system along with Romania, 
Slovakia, Czech Republic. 
 
German government voiced its concerns towards these developments as Chancellor 
Angela Merkel emphasized the importance of Europe acting as a whole to help the 
refugees and said, “If we don’t succeed in fairly distributing refugees then of course the 
Schengen question will be on the agenda for many (Eddy 2015)”. While Angela Merkel 
highlighted the importance of the refugee crisis, the Interior Minister of Germany Thomas 
de Maizière said that the rules of Dublin Regulation cannot be the sole solution to the 
refugee crisis. He said “This is a challenge for us all, we all need to make an effort. But 
the burden is not too heavy for Germany. We will take care of it (Vasagar and Robinson 
2015).” Germany was in the leader position of migration crisis which shows that while 
the most critical country could not solve its domestic bargaining, then why a uniform 
response could not have been achieved makes more sense.  
 
Sweden and Germany were the ones who supported refugees in comparison to other 
small-scaled EU member states. According to the Dublin Regulations states which EU 
member state will be responsible for asylum claims by people who arrive in Europe, 
                                                 
8 QMV: 55% of member states representing 65% of the EU population would be enough to pass a resolution. 
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meaning that when a refugee is registered to one country than that state will be 
responsible. This caused Greece and Hungary to accept an unbalanced number of 
refugees coming from Balkans, whereas Italy received from North Africa. For this reason, 
Germany suspended the regulations to help the refugees. However, even in Germany, 
there were contradictions, that time’s premier of Bavaria Horst Seehofer was against the 
policy conducted by Merkel (Deutch Welle 2018). 
 
Especially, reactions coming from by Hungarian leader Viktor Orbán were amongst the 
most critical ones. Viktor Orbán (Hungarian Prime Minister) said that “EU states should 
be allowed to set their own rules on migrants, and that Hungary did not want any of them 
(Vincenti 2015)” and “The European idea that somebody allows refugees into their own 
country and then distributes them to other member states is mad and unfair (Schalit 
2015)” opposing to the suggestions of proposed quota plans for the refugee crisis. Orbán 
was strictly against the migration plans in which he also stated that “distinction should be 
made between the movement of labor within EU borders and the entry of people from 
outside the bloc (Jacobsen 2015).” Not only statements but Hungary also took concrete 
action by declaring that they would build up a fence on the Serbian border to prevent 
illegal immigrants (Schalit 2015). As the asylum numbers were increasing, critics were 
coming towards the Dublin System in which Hungary was struggling because of the 
system. The system required the protection of asylum seeker wherever the entrance is 
made but because of Hungary’s geographical position, many of the asylum seekers had 
to use the route through Hungarian borders. But even Hungary insisted on the EU to tackle 
migrants, the Union decided to send migrants to where they were registered first (Robert 
2015). In September 2015, Hungary declared that they were going to shut the Serbian 
border for the asylum seekers. Orbán said that “he is acting to save Europe’s “Christian 
values” by blocking the main overland route used by mainly Muslim refugees (Than 
2015)” which shows the tension of the crisis caused by the conflicts by the member states. 
Because of Hungary’s acts building a fence and closing the borders, migrants started to 
use alternative routes like Croatia. But in September 2015, Croatia closed its borders 
(Schalit 2015). As the EU tried to find solutions to the chaos in Balkans, countries from 
the region were strictly against EU suggestions. At the mini-summit in Balkans, Bulgarian 
Prime Minister Boyko Borissov stated that: “If Germany, Austria and other countries 
close their borders, we will not let our peoples become a buffer zone. We will be ready 
in the same way to close our borders (Gotev, 2015)” which showed that the EU was not 
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effective for finding solutions for the Balkan route, as well. In March 2016, the Balkan 
Route was closed because Austria, Slovenia, Serbia, Macedonia and Croatia had closed 
down their borders which caused migrants to trap in Greece (BBC, 2016). However, why 
some member states were reluctant towards accepting refugees and their domestic context 
is beyond the scope of this thesis but showing some of the preferences was necessary to 
see how the refugee deal with Turkey came up as a solution to the crisis. 
 
As can be seen from the reactions coming from the EU member states, proposing an EU 
level policy was not easy. Since member states did not want refugees in their countries, a 
deal with Turkey emerged out of this crisis. For this reason, they started to focus on their 
cooperation with Turkey for the sake of security of “Fortress Europe”. One of the most 
effective instruments they have initiated to deal with the migration crisis until this day are 
the carrots (Demirsu and Cihangir-Tetik 2018, 13) that were given to Turkey. Thus, 
divergent member state preferences (Müftüler-Baç 2018) pushed the European states to 
find a solution that would be in benefit for all which paved the way for the reconstructing 
of the Turkish-European relation regarding the migration crisis.  
 
To understand Turkey’s role in the migration challenges of the European Union, this 
chapter will evaluate cooperation with Turkey in a detailed manner. Therefore, with this 
chapter, it is vital to evaluate what role that Turkey has been playing to deal with the 
migration crisis starting from what kind of foreign policy instruments the EU uses for the 
Migration Policy and the approach with Turkey. The 2013 Readmission Agreement, 2015 
Joint Action Plan and EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 will be evaluated which are crucial 
to see how the EU-Turkey relationship has developed ever since the Union needed the 
assistance for tackling the crisis. With crisis management, mutual relation between 
Turkey and the EU has developed. For this reason, this chapter evaluates Turkey’s role 
until the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016; since the focus is on what kind of role Turkey 
played and what kind of incentives were given to deal with the crisis. While assessing the 
development of relation with Turkey, the factsheets, the European Commission press 
releases, the legal context of the agreements are evaluated in order to observe the 
framework of cooperation with Turkey.  
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4.1.  Foreign Policy Instruments of the European Union for the Migration 
Policy 
 
 
For decades, the European Union has been trying to develop a foreign policy, which has 
certain policy tools to deal with the migration. To evaluate how Turkey has played a vital 
role in the migration crisis of the EU, examining the foreign policy instruments of the 
European Union for the Migration Policy is necessary before writing about the 
developments. The migration policy of the Union has several pillars which are legal 
migration and integration, irregular migration and return, Common European Asylum 
System, Schengen borders and visas, innovation and industry for security, organized 
crime and human trafficking, crisis and terrorism, police cooperation, international 
affairs, Europe for Citizens Programme, European Agenda on Migration, European 
Agenda on Security and securing EU borders. 
 
To start with the general framework of external migration policy of the EU, it is necessary 
to highlight what is the “Global Approach to Migration and Mobility” (GAMM). GAMM 
is part of International Affairs pillar which has been trying to develop a policy with 
partner countries. GAMM is the “overarching framework (EUROPA 2019)” of the 
European Union for its external migration and asylum policies. According to the EU 
definition, the priorities are defined as “better organizing legal migration, and fostering 
well-managed mobility, preventing and combatting irregular migration, and eradicating 
trafficking in human beings, maximizing the development impact of migration and 
mobility, promoting international protection, and enhancing the external dimension of 
asylum (EUROPA 2019)”. Concerning the “external dimension” of the EU migration 
policy (Boswell 2015, 620), which is the Union’s migration policy regarding the non-EU 
states, which are “attempts to manage migration through cooperation with migration 
sending or transit countries (EUROPA 2019).” Therefore, since Turkey is an important 
part of the external dimension of migration policy evaluating the relations between the 
EU and Turkey is necessary for the EU since the Union’s response to migration 
challenges remained insufficient.  
 
“Political instruments (bilateral and regional policy dialogues and action plans), legal 
instruments (such as visa facilitation and readmission agreements), operational support 
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and capacity building and project support made available to third countries and other 
stakeholders (EUROPA 2019)” are used to tackle the crisis of the Union. The instruments 
used for Turkey are also part of these tools in which makes Turkey a crucial partner for 
tackling with the migration crisis.  
 
Migration management of the EU is conducted by partnership and readmission 
agreements (Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi 2014, 152). For instance, one instrument 
used with Turkey is the readmission agreements which has been an important policy tool 
of the EU migration policy. A readmission agreement aims to prevent illegal settlement 
in one country by identifying and returning that person (Ahmet İçduygu and Aksel 2014, 
337). This kind of agreements is signed between the EU and with 3rd countries in order 
to prevent illegal trespassing. The negotiations regarding the readmission agreement 
between Turkey and EU dates back to the beginning of 2000 (Wolff 2014, 77) which 
continues to the signature of the agreement in 2013. In the following part, the process and 
what kind of incentives were given to Turkey regarding the Readmission Agreement will 
be evaluated. Other initiatives to deal with the crises were the Joint Action Plan and the 
Statement of 2016 which will be evaluated to see Turkey’s role in the EU’s migration 
crisis. 
 
Concerning the European Migration Agenda of the EU which was adopted by the 
European Commission in 2015 to be able to deal with the crises, had certain priorities one 
of which was the “safe third countries”. Western Balkan and EU candidate countries 
would become crucial partners to enable safe countries in order to prevent migration flows 
which Turkey was part of it. With regards to the Agenda, it can be argued that Turkey 
was a part of creating safe third countries by observing the steps taken by the EU and 
Turkey. 
 
 
4.2. An Overview of the 2013 Readmission Agreement 
 
 
In 2011, the world faced a new crisis on the soil of the Middle East. When the Syrian 
Civil War had begun, the fate and future of both Turkey and the European Union have 
changed regarding tackling the civil war and refugee flows. Because Turkey was a 
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neighbor with Syria, refugee flows were coming to Turkey whereas they were entering 
illegally to the borders of the European Union by using many transit routes. Between 
1995 and 2011, there were only 635 asylum applications from Syria whereas in 2014 this 
number increased to 900.000 in which approximately 200.000 of them were living at 
refugee camps (Kirişçi 2014). According to UNHCR data, the number of Syrian refugees 
in 2014 was 1.6 million, whereas in 2015 this number increased to 2.5 million (UNHCR 
2019). For this reason, after completing the negotiations, new initiatives were taken by 
both the EU and Turkey side.  
 
On 16 December 2013, Turkey and European Union relations marked a new phase for 
the future of their relations. The Readmission Agreement was signed between two, with 
enabling Visa Liberalisation Dialogue, as well. When the agreement was signed by EU 
Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström, she stated her hopes that this 
agreement and visa liberalization dialogue would boost the relation of the EU and Turkey 
(EUROPA 2014). To give a concrete background, it is necessary to evaluate the content 
of the agreement with regards to EU and Turkey relations as well as how the EU tried to 
tackle with the refugee flows coming from Turkey. The aim of a readmission agreement 
is to control the flow of refugees by creating rules and obligations (İçduygu 2011). For 
this reason, observing the content of the agreement can give us a framework on what kind 
of incentives were given for Turkey by the EU. 
 
First of all, provisions of this agreement were based on the principle of reciprocity in 
which both signatures would have their responsibility to implement the necessities of the 
agreement. This means the readmission of the people who had entered to the other side 
illegally and the return policy of those illegal entrances (İKV, 2019). Within the content 
of the agreement, it is also stated that the illegal incomers regulations would enter into 
force three years later than 2014 which was the operationalization year of this agreement. 
The incentive or the carrot that was given to Turkey was the elimination of visa 
restrictions to Turkish citizens for the entrance to the European borders without any rules. 
This has been a long-term desire of the Turkish government since it would not only open 
the borders of Europe to Turkey, also would also be closeness towards the Union referring 
to the membership.  
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The process of visa liberalization was stated under the “Roadmap Towards a Visa Free 
Regime with Turkey”, quoting from the dialogue, one of the provisions of the document 
was “identifies the areas where Turkey will have to undertake legislative and 
administrative reforms with a view to establishing a secure environment for visa-free 
travel (EUROPA 2013)”. As can be seen from the dialogue, the incentive that was given 
to Turkey was the visa liberalization in return for the readmission provisions.  
 
Requirements for the visa liberalization were defined by the roadmap which is related to 
defining the illegal immigrants and their readmission criteria. To give an example 
regarding the readmission policy, one of the provisions was “Establish and implement 
internal procedures allowing for the rapid and effective identification and return of 
Turkish citizens, third-country nationals and stateless persons who do not, or no longer, 
fulfill the conditions for entry to (EUROPA 2015)” which shows how EU uses Turkey to 
tackle the refugee flows coming from there. Turkey would become a buffer zone between 
the Syrian refugees and EU borders in which would be highly beneficial for the Union. 
With regards to the roadmap, there were not only provisions related to readmission 
procedure but also other things like Turkey to secure the borders, opening its access to 
refugee data or provisions referring to human rights, as well (EUROPA 2015). In short, 
it can be said that Turkey was a crucial partner for the EU to tackle its problems since 
finding a concrete solution among themselves has never been easy for the migration 
policy.  
 
To conclude this part, the progress of the application of the readmission agreement is 
crucial, as well. The Commission reports for 2014 and 2016 (AVRUPAINFO 2015) 
indicated that regarding the fulfillment of the roadmap requirements are not yet 
implemented as the EU expected from Turkey which may cause struggles in the 
relationship of both. To give an example, Commission Report on the Visa Liberalization 
Dialogue of 2014 stated that, “In all the areas where the Commission assesses that the 
requirements of a benchmark are not yet entirely fulfilled (EUROPA 2014).” In addition, 
the third report on the Visa Liberalization Dialogue which was published in May 2016 
indicated that “Turkey still needs to undertake in order to fulfill the last outstanding 
benchmarks of the Roadmap and to enable the European Parliament and the Council to 
adopt the legislative proposal made by the Commission (EUROPA 2014).” 
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Readmission Agreement was part of Europe’s policy for tacking with refugee flows yet, 
was not the only one. In the next part of this chapter, the initiatives after the 2015 
migration crisis will be evaluated in order to see what other kinds of carrots that were 
promised to Turkey. In general, it can be said that the EU used Turkey to deal with its 
external problems and to secure its borders in which shows a relation between both has 
been continuing even there were struggles. Because of the incentive-based feature of the 
readmission agreements (Wolff 2014, 70), carrots that were suggested to Turkey shows 
both actors had tried to benefit from the signature of the readmission agreement. 
 
 
4.3. EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan and EU-Turkey Statement (18 March 2016) 
 
 
The more concrete cooperation between the European Union and Turkey occurred after 
the 2015 migration crisis. The Migration Crisis reached its peak point in 2015 with more 
than one million refugees and migrants crossing Europe according to IOM numbers. Ever 
since the 2015 migration crisis, the Union has tried to develop coping mechanisms and 
tools to deal with the flux of immigrants in which many of them were reluctant due to the 
interests of different member states. As mentioned before, the role of Turkey has been 
vital ever since the Syrian conflict started which became more vital especially after the 
2015 crises. Even there were many Justice and Home Affairs Councils, struggles to find 
a common solution to the problem or new relocation system; the most effective solution 
that worked was the cooperation with Turkey. The quickest and short-termed solution for 
the crises was cooperation with Turkey (European Stability Initiative 2015) in which 
makes its role vital to analyze. For this reason, the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan and its 
content will be evaluated to see what kind of role Turkey has played tackling the 
migration crisis of the Union. 
 
During the October 2015, Justice and Home Affairs Council(JHA) of the Union and other 
gatherings were dominated by the most vital problem which was the migration-related 
topics and how to deal with those. To give an example, on the 8th of October 2015, the 
JHA Council was gathered to discuss the migration crisis. The focus was on the 
challenges the EU has been facing through in which member states agreed on to develop 
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collective responsibility. Minister of Luxemburg who was also the Council president at 
that time stated that: 
 
“The Presidency considers that today's debate will assist in the preparations 
of next week's European Council. The future of Schengen depends on the 
credible and effective control of the EU's external borders. This is a 
particularly high priority within the overall European Agenda on Migration 
(EUROPA 2015).” 
 
In addition, on the 15th of October 2015, the European Council gathered to discuss the 
migration crisis. The opening provision of the discussions indicated that the migration 
crisis was the priority of the EU:  
 
“Tackling the migration and refugee crisis is a common obligation which 
requires a comprehensive strategy and a determined effort over time in a spirit 
of solidarity and responsibility (EUROPA 2015).” 
 
On the 3rd and 4th of October 2015, Jean Claude Junkers who is the President of the 
European Commission and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of Turkish Republic, 
gathered in Brussels to negotiate the Joint Action Plan to be another step for Turkey to 
achieve the visa liberalization defined by the roadmap (EUROPA 2015). The Eastern 
Mediterranean -Western Balkans route conference on 8 October 2015 had a result related 
to Turkey which was “We are facing a common challenge. As partners, we need to 
respond collectively with solidarity” in which suggested engaging with partners like 
Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey (EUROPA 2015). The Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
Council occurred the next day, highlighted the “Cooperation with the countries of origin 
and transit is key to successful return operations” as well (EUROPA 2015). On October 
15, the European Council was gathered in which it was emphasized the importance of the 
Joint Action Plan regarding the cooperation with origin and transit countries. Later on, on 
October 18, German Chancellor Angela Merkel visited Turkey, which was crucial 
because, after the problems with relocation system, cooperation with Turkey was a long-
term plan of the Chancellor (Demirsu and Cihangir-Tetik 2018, 3). After Donald Tusk 
emphasized on the summit with Turkey and EU on October 12, Turkey and EU leaders 
gathered on the 29 November 2015. 
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When the context of the plan is examined, it can be seen that the Union was giving carrots 
to Turkey in order to deal with the burden of the crisis. For instance, “re-energizing” of 
the accession process of Turkey or the opening of Chapter 17 on Economic and Monetary 
Policy were examples regarding the carrots. Other incentives to be given to Turkey were 
the distribution of the 3 billion euros and for its role in dealing the refugee crisis, the 
Union’s continues humanitarian assistance, and one of the most important ones was the 
visa liberalization. In return, the EU expected from Turkey to document the data of 
migrants to be able to keep track of their movements, implementation of international 
protection and facilitate “temporary protection” for Syrians in Turkey: 
 
“The EU will provide immediate and continuous humanitarian assistance in 
Turkey. It will also expand significantly its overall financial support. A 
Refugee Facility for Turkey was established by the Commission to coordinate 
and streamline actions financed in order to deliver efficient and 
complementary support to Syrians under temporary protection and host 
communities in Turkey. The EU is committed to provide an initial 3 billion 
euro of additional resources. The need for and nature of this funding will be 
reviewed in the light of the developing situation (Republic of Turkey Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 2015).” 
 
Concerning the Readmission Agreement, the EU also expected Turkey to accept irregular 
migrants who did not need international protection. In addition to these, cooperation with 
border states like Greece and Bulgaria were also mentioned in the Joint Action Plan 
(Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015).  
 
On 7 March 2016, Ahmet Davutoğlu, then prime minister of Turkey and the heads of EU 
member states discussed the future of migration crisis and the agreement conducted with 
Turkey. During this meeting, they agreed to work on the decisions that were taken 
previously in order to deal with the migration flows (EUROPA 2016). The statement 
reaffirmed the Joint Action Plan and cooperation with Turkey and also Turkey agreed on 
“to accept the rapid return of all migrants not in need of international protection crossing 
from Turkey into Greece and to take back all irregular migrants intercepted in Turkish 
waters (EUROPA 2016)”. A week later, on the 17th and18th of March 2016 European 
Council was gathered to discuss the migration crisis in which resulted as the EU-Turkey 
Statement on 18th of March. The statement is also crucial to evaluate because it shows the 
EU’s eagerness to cooperate with Turkey whereas Turkey was pleased by this mutually 
beneficial relation, as well. The 2016 Statement also known as the “refugee deal (Demirsu 
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and Cihangir-Tetik 2018, 4)” was an important step with regards to EU and Turkey 
relation. Regarding the statement, there were new points that were emphasized by both 
the EU and Turkey. The distribution of 3 billion euros would be accelerated, the visa 
liberalization would be achieved by the end of June 2016, upgrading of the Customs 
Union and also the opening of Chapter 33 was set as a next step. Turkey’s vital role in 
this statement, that for every Syrian coming back to Turkey, another Syrian would be 
back to the EU which was addressed before. Also, Turkey would act on its role in 
preventing illegal immigration (EUROPA 2016). To show an overall contribution of 
Turkey regarding its responsibilities coming from the statement, factsheets on an annual 
basis should be evaluated. The table demonstrates cooperation with Turkey, the number 
of irregular migrants decreased. 
 
Table 4.1 Returns of irregular migrants to Turkey under the EU-Turkey Statement 
(Europa 2018) 
 One Year Before the 
Statement 
2017 2018 
Returns of 
irregular 
migrants to 
Turkey under 
the EU-Turkey 
Statement 
627 1504 2164 
Arrivals to 
Greece 
988.703 27.711 57.45 
  
All of which shows that the EU was in need of Turkish cooperation for the crisis which 
was because member state preferences were different from each other. Even Merkel tried 
to come up with the relocation plan or any assistance for the crises, other states were not 
sharing the same perception as her. The EU’s problems paved the way for the cooperation 
with Turkey in which the Turkish government benefited by guaranteeing carrots that 
would be given to them. The bargaining process between two was on the basis of mutual 
interests with interdependence among the two actors. Turkey was able to gain from the 
carrots that had offered them and in return, the EU was able to take under control the 
migration crisis (Saatçioğlu 2019, 9). Divergent preferences caused to find a solution not 
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internally but externally in which Turkey became the most critical actor for dealing with 
the migration crisis of the EU.  
 
Overall, when the role of Turkey is examined, it can be said that there were many attempts 
to cooperate with Turkey for the elimination of migration flows. Readmission Agreement 
was one of them in which based on reciprocity regarding the illegal entrances in return 
for visa liberalization for Turkey. But, especially after 2015, the migration crisis started 
to affect the EU severely in which more concrete solutions were needed. Since converging 
with 28 member states was not possible, Turkey became the main actor to deal with the 
crisis. The 2015 Joint Action Plan which followed by the March 2016 EU-Turkey 
Statements are crucial steps for evaluating the role of Turkey for the crises of EU. By 
offering incentives to Turkey like aid, boosting the membership process and visa 
liberalization; the Union was able to cooperate with Turkey to tackle the migration crisis. 
This shows Turkey was the most important step to tackle the migration crisis which 
indicates that after a devastating crisis like that EU and Turkey cooperation improved in 
line with finding solutions to the crises. The interests of both paved a way for mutual, 
interdependent relation. 
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5. THE EU’S EVALUATION ON TURKEY IN JUSTICE AND HOME 
AFFAIRS SINCE 2016  
 
 
 
“The world is not dealing with a crisis of migration, but rather a crisis of union and 
leadership.” – IOM DG William Lacy Swing 
 
The relations between Turkey and the European Union (EU) have always been an 
attractive topic to research. Especially with the Syrian Civil War and the refugee crisis of 
the EU, the connection between both actors drew attention among many scholars. Since 
Turkey is a crucial actor for the EU to cope with the migrant crisis, there has been a 
special focus on Turkey, as well. From the start of the Syrian civil war and the migration 
crisis of the EU, Turkey has become a key actor for the Union. Thus, the relations in 
recent years between both has been centered around the migration crisis and how to deal 
with this issue. Having good and stable relations with Turkey became a critical issue for 
EU and increased the interdependence between both which shows even there were critical 
problems among each other, a centered relation on migration crisis has been on the agenda 
for the recent years. 
 
Turkey’s role safeguarding the EU’s borders and controlling the irregular migration is 
unquestionable. Ever since the Syrian refugee crisis accelerated, Turkey’s role became 
more important for the Union. Especially with the signature of the 2013 Readmission 
Agreement, Turkey’s role started to become more crucial as a buffer zone. Following 
these agreements, the 2015 Joint Action Plan (JAP) and 2016 EU-Turkey Statement has 
been crucial milestones regarding the relation between EU and Turkey tackling the 
migration crisis. By those agreements, Turkey enabled the EU to deal with the crisis.  
The period after the Joint Action Plan and the EU-Turkey Statement is also critical to 
evaluate, as well. Therefore, the aim of this section is to examine the Union perception of 
Turkey by referring to whether Turkey is complying with the agreements. By looking at 
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what happened since the 2015 JAP and 2016 Statement, evaluating the approach of the 
EU towards Turkey happened to be a significant issue. By these developments, a new 
form of cooperation emerged out of the migration crisis. For this reason, the reports 
published by the European Union on Turkey and the reports of the agreements will be 
examined in order to observe EU’s evaluation of Turkey, particularly on the issue of 
migration. Also, the statements of leaders and the European Parliament’s will be 
elaborated in order to frame the relationship between both and particularly the EU 
perception of Turkey for the refugee crisis.  
 
 
5.1.  The EU’s Evaluation on Turkey in Justice and Home Affairs in 2016 
 
 
The year 2016 was a very interesting period for EU and Turkey relations. The 
Readmission Plan that was signed in 2013, the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan in 2015, 
followed by the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement turned out to be crucial milestones in terms 
of migration based relation of both actors.  
 
The 2015 Plan contained provisions reconsidering of Turkey’s accession process and 
grant of 3 billion Euros for refugees, visa liberalization and humanitarian assistance by 
the EU in exchange for Turkey to keep a record of migrants, to implement the 
international protection of Syrian Refugees (EUROPA 2016). In addition to the 2015 
Plan, the 2016 Statement contained “Turkey to accept the rapid return of all migrants not 
in need of international protection crossing from Turkey into Greece and to take back all 
irregular migrants intercepted in Turkish waters” (EUROPA 2016). Also, 3 billion euros 
would be distributed to Turkey quickly, the visa liberalization to be achieved by the end 
of June 2016, reconsideration of the Customs Union and also the opening of Chapter 33 
were other topics that were agreed on. Another determinant in the EU-Turkey relation in 
2016 was the 15th July coup attempt happened in Turkey which also affected the 
development of relations between both.  
 
All of the developments were critical determinants of EU-Turkey relations, thus, 
evaluating the progress reports, factsheets and the statements of politicians are crucial to 
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understanding how the progress on the agreements and EU perception of Turkey with 
regards to migration issue has been developed. 
 
The year 2016 has some interesting political discourses regarding EU Turkey relations. 
In April 2016, Ahmet Davutoğlu, who was the Prime Minister of Turkey at that time, 
threatened the Union by referring to the visa-free process and acceleration of membership 
process and said that “These pledges are mutual. If the EU does not take the necessary 
steps, it would be unthinkable for Turkey to do so” (Solaker 2016). This was not the only 
threat coming from a Turkish politician. Previous to Davutoğlu, Mevlüt Çavuğoğlu said, 
the foreign minister of Turkey, “If the EU doesn't keep its word, including the migrants 
deal we will cancel all agreements (Solaker 2016).” All the rhetoric of the politicians of 
Turkey indicates that Turkey had leverage over the EU by using its strategic position of 
the migrant deal which is no surprise that even after the coup attempt in Turkey in July 
2016, Commission report of 2018 still indicated Turkey as a critical partner. The Report 
will be evaluated in more detail in the following paragraphs. 
 
On the 9th of October 2016, the Report9 of Turkey was published by the European 
Commission. Even though there was deterioration of relations since the coup attempt in 
Turkey, the report starts with the phrase “Turkey remains a key partner for the European 
Union (Turkey Progress Report 2016)”, but in the next paragraphs warns Turkey to 
respect rule of law and fundamental rights because of the measures taken by the Turkish 
government after 15th of July. These were stated in the introduction of the report which 
shows that the EU thinks Turkey as a critical partner but do not consider Turkey is fully 
respectful to crucial EU norms like rule of law and fundamental freedoms.  
 
However, for the purpose of this chapter, particularly the section of Chapter 24 of the 
report will be evaluated which is the “Justice, Freedom and Security”. Some of the issues 
this chapter deals with are border control, visas, migration and asylum, police 
cooperation, the fight against organized crime and against terrorism and drugs (EUROPA 
2019). Since, the aim of this thesis to evaluate problems originated from migration 
challenges, particularly, “Justice, Freedom and Security” section of the progress reports 
will be elaborated to see what has been achieved by the cooperation with Turkey. 
                                                 
9 Formerly named as Progress Reports. 
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Therefore, Turkey’s development regarding the agreements and tackling with migration 
crisis is evaluated under this chapter. 
 
When the 2014 and 2016 reports are compared, perception of the EU remained the same 
regarding Chapter 24. It is stated that: 
 
“There was good progress in the area of justice, freedom and security in a 
challenging environment. Turkey is making considerable humanitarian 
efforts in supporting an increasing influx of refugees from Syria as well as 
from Iraq (Turkey Progress Report 2014).” 
 
Regarding the 2016 Progress Report, it is claimed that there was “good progress (Turkey 
Progress Report 2016)” in the previous year the issues related to Chapter 24. It is 
emphasized the fact that Turkey complies with the duties given by the agreement signed 
between both. Within the report, there was a reference made to the Readmission 
Agreement indicating that EU was not satisfied with the progress of Turkey: 
 
“Implementation of the agreement for Turkish nationals remained 
nevertheless unsatisfactory as the provisions of the agreement were not 
observed in a systematic and coherent manner by all Turkish diplomatic 
missions in the EU (Turkey Progress Report 2016).” 
 
Also, regarding the visa policy, it is stated that:  
 
“Turkey needs to further harmonise its visa policy with the EU common visa 
policy. Further efforts are needed to align its legislation with the Visa 
Regulation, Visa Code and other relevant EU legislation (Turkey Progress 
Report 2016).” 
 
The perception over the visa section is crucial because of the incentives that were 
promised to Turkey was the visa liberalization in which Turkish citizens would be a part 
of the Schengen zone. According to the Third Report for the Requirements of Visa 
Liberalization Roadmap, “Turkey adopted reforms aimed at meeting all the requirements 
of the visa liberalization” which led Turkey was one of the countries with no requirements 
when it meets seven remaining benchmarks (Solaker 2016). This showed Turkey would 
be part of the visa free zone when the EU would consider Turkey ready for this step.  
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However, in November 2016, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s stated “You never treated 
humanity honestly and you did not look after people fairly. You did not pick up babies 
when they washed ashore on the Mediterranean. We are the ones who are feeding around 
3.5 million refugees in this country”, “Listen to me. If you go any further, then the 
frontiers will be opened, bear that in mind (Kroet 2016).” However, the EU considered 
itself successful for fulfilling its promises regarding Turkey. This can be seen by the 
words of Merkel’s spokesperson, where she said that EU is standing by its promises for 
the agreement (Kroet 2016). 
 
According to a Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2010, only 59% of the EU citizens 
were opposed to Turkey whereas, in 2016, this number increased to 76% (Yougov 2016). 
Also, according to a public opinion survey conducted for EU membership of Turkey in 
2016 which shows that EU citizens are not in favor of Turkey even though Turkey is a 
critical partner for tackling the migration crisis. 
 
Table 5.1 Turkey’s Membership Poll (Yougov 2016) 
Membership of 
Turkey UK Germany France Denmark Sweden Finland 
 
Norway 
Turkey should 
join the EU 8% 5% 8% 6% 7% 5% 11% 
Turkey should 
not join the EU 67% 86% 74% 82% 73% 83% 65% 
Don't know 25% 9% 18% 12% 20% 12% 25% 
 
 
As it can be seen from the reports and developments between both actors, relation 
between Turkey and the EU was still developing despite the public opinion toward Turkey 
was deteriorating. Thus, this applies the EU still needed Turkey to cope with migration 
crisis which shows why the report still implies that Turkey was a critical partner.  
 
With references to the 2016 Progress Report, there has been an increase in the cooperation 
between the EU and Turkey. For instance, especially with the legal and irregular 
migration, both actors were in cooperation in which EU supported and funded Turkish 
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coastguards. In addition, EU enhanced the capacity of Turkish The General Directorate 
for Migration Management (DGMM) in order to tackle the migration flows.10 Not only 
for migration but also regarding other Justice, freedom and security subtopics, 
cooperation with Turkey can be detected from the progress report. Particularly, 
cooperation with regards to the fight against terrorism and Schengen and external borders 
section were emphasized. Regarding the external borders, Turkey’s contribution is critical 
in which it enhances the border management and signs a tripartite agreement with 
Bulgaria and Greece to control irregular crossings. All of these shows the importance of 
Turkey increased after the EU thought Turkey as a solution to the refugee flows.  
 
 
5.2. The EU’s Evaluation on Turkey in Justice and Home Affairs in 2017 
 
 
In May 2017, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, European Council 
President Donald Tusk and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met in Brussels where they talked 
about the current EU-Turkey relations. One of the topics of discussion in the meeting was 
with regards to the migration issue as they agreed on the full implementation of the 2016 
EU-Turkey Statement.  
 
Later, on the 25th of July 2017, High-Level Political Dialogue between EU-Turkey was 
conducted in Brussels. Issues like “Turkey's EU accession negotiations, the migration 
crisis, visa liberalization dialogue, an update of Customs Union” were discussed 
(Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017). The EU’s support for the Syrian 
refugees in Turkey was another part of the meeting. These issues were topics that were 
stated under the 2015 Joint Action Plan and the 2016 Statement which again shows even 
the political situation in Turkey was critical, EU perceived Turkey as a critical actor for 
coping with the migration crisis which indicates the rational perception of EU towards 
Turkey.  
 
Even there were bumps in the relation of EU and Turkey, EU seemed grateful for the 
results of the 2016 Statement which the Commission published “EU Turkey Statement - 
                                                 
10 Appendix A 
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One Year On” fact sheet. According to the fact sheet, only after one year, the irregular 
arrivals to the EU dropped by 97% and also the death on the sea decreased significantly, 
as well (EUROPA 2017). On this report, it is also stated that the EU delivered its promises 
to Turkey for the financial support whereas Turkey “followed up its commitment” 
towards the promises it made (EUROPA 2017). To assess the evaluation of the EU 
towards Turkey, it can be said that even there were negative dialogues between both 
actors, still, the EU perceived Turkey as a critical actor to tackle migration. Even the 
relations were politically in trouble, the cooperation regarding the 2016 Statement 
continued in which EU needed the support of Turkey. 
 
 
5.3. The EU’s Evaluation on Turkey in Justice and Home Affairs in 2018 and 
the Current Situation 
 
 
Regarding the Justice and Home Affairs, Turkey and the EU did not start the year 
positively. In February 2018, the EU emphasized that Turkey should change its terrorism 
law for a visa-free European Union which was still a critical issue between both actors 
(Gotev 2018). Yet, one can argue that the refugee deal between EU and Turkey increased 
the interdependence between both in which normally, the relation could have been 
deteriorated even more if the deal did not exist. 
 
Turkey played a critical role in controlling the migration flows again in 2018. In March 
2018, there was the Varna Summit in Bulgaria in which Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was 
invited, as well. The main topics of this Summit were mostly related to migration and 
how to control this issue. Even there were some comments of Turkey to respect the 
international law and its actions in the Mediterranean Sea which was also talked at the 
European Council prior to the Varna Summit, regarding the migration the narratives were 
more positive. Donald Tusk’s words on this topic were positive where he said “I would 
like to express our appreciation for the impressive work Turkey has been doing” which 
appreciated Turkey’s role on this issue (EUROPA 2018). 
  
Annual report written by the Commission was published on 17th of April 2018. To 
observe the perception of EU, some parts of the report should be emphasized, as well. To 
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start with the introduction of the 2018 report, like in the 2016 Report Turkey being an 
important factor is emphasized (Turkey Report 2018) in which shows the EU considers 
Turkey crucial for its interests. Still, in the introduction part, the migration crisis was 
emphasized which is one of the most important aspects of the EU-Turkey relations in 
recent years.  
 
In the summary of the report it is stated by the Commission that “Turkey made good 
progress in the area of migration and asylum policy and remained committed to the 
implementation of the March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement effective management of 
migratory flows along the Eastern Mediterranean route (Turkey Report 2018)” which 
shows the EU perceives Turkey as a good partner for dealing with the migratory flows 
whereas emphasizes on the visa liberalization to be discussed in the Commission. 
Regarding the visa liberalization talks, it shows that the EU sees Turkey’s contribution 
good to negotiate the demands of Turkey.  
 
When the details of the report are examined, the role of Turkey was critical coping the 
irregular migrants in which EU needed the cooperation of Turkey.11 As like the 2016 
Report, Turkey’s role regarding the legal and irregular migration has increased. The 
Chapter 24 of the report showed that like in the 2016 report, it is stated Turkey’s progress 
was good in the past year which again shows even there were tensions in 2017, the area 
of migration kept the EU perception of Turkey more positive: 
 
“Turkey is moderately prepared in the area of justice, freedom and security. 
There was good progress in the past year, in particular in the area of migration 
and asylum policy. Turkey remained committed to implementing the March 
2016 EU-Turkey Statement and played a key role in ensuring effective 
management of migratory flows along the Eastern Mediterranean route 
(Turkey Report 2018).” 
 
However, like stated in the 2016 report, EU evaluation of Turkey regarding the 
Readmission Agreement was not as positive as the 2016 Statement: 
 
“Turkey is not yet implementing the provisions relating to third-country 
nationals in the EU-Turkey readmission agreement, despite these entering 
into force on 1 October 2017 (Turkey Report 2018).” 
                                                 
11Appendix C 
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Still, with regards to the 2016 Statement which is one of the most critical junctures of 
EU-Turkey cooperation on migration, the EU evaluation of Turkey was good and shows 
the importance of mutual cooperation. Turkey’s role in the 2016 Statement was regarded 
as good. According to the 2018 Report and the “Two Years On” fact sheet of the EU, the 
irregular arrivals were still lower than 97% which was the same percentage as the last 
year. When the overall data is examined from these documents, the EU is satisfied with 
Turkey’s commitments and implementations regarding the 2016 Statement. 
 
Even the Union is sufficient of the results of the Statement, there is also criticism over 
implementation of the Readmission Agreement (RA). The RA was based on the principle 
of reciprocity which means the readmission of the people who had entered to the other 
side illegally and the return policy of those illegal entrances. However, there was criticism 
concerning the RA. According to the report it is stated that “Turkey is not yet 
implementing the provisions relating to third-country nationals in the EU-Turkey 
readmission agreement, despite these entering into force on 1 October 2017 (EUROPA 
2018)”. Unlike the previous report, there was a negative comment on the implementation 
of the RA. With reference to the report, EU perceived Turkey better for tackling with 
migratory flows which had decreased in comparison to past where Turkey took “proactive 
action” towards the migrant routes. Yet, the unsatisfactory thought of the EU is stated 
detailly with regards to RA where it is stated that Turkey did not readmit third-country 
nationals from Bulgaria, which was a part of the RA (Turkey Report 2018). Yet, “Three 
Years On” 2016 Statement fact sheet, which was published in 2019, indicated that Turkey 
is still a critical partner in tackling with the migration crisis. Yet, one criticism came from 
Merkel in 2019 where she said the deal is not working properly (Reuters 2019) which 
shows there is an unhappiness with regards to the implementation of the deal, as well.  
 
When the issues regarding the 2016 Statement is examined, it can be said that Turkey’s 
role in the EU is critical. It is stated that Turkey made good progress regarding the Chapter 
of Justice, Freedom and Security in which especially EU thought efforts of Turkey 
positive for the 2016 Statement. Even their relation is still not perfect, interdependence 
over the migration crisis has created a new form of cooperation between the European 
Union and Turkey. To observe this situation more detailly, the refugee data will be 
examined in the next chapter to see the critical role of Turkey.   
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6. PARTNERSHIP WITH TURKEY: STATISTICAL EVIDENCE 
 
 
 
The partnership with Turkey has been one of the most critical aspects of Turkey-European 
Union relations in recent years. The flow of refugees coming to Europe and the lack of 
response of the EU caused a new direction to tackle the crisis. The solution that the Union 
has found was the cooperation with Turkey by trying to control the flows with the Joint 
Action Plan 2015) and EU-Turkey Statement (2016) that were conducted by giving 
incentives to Turkey. Thus, the role of Turkey in the migration challenged of EU is 
unquestionable. To see the importance of this cooperation, under this chapter refugee data 
will be evaluated to see what has been achieved with the help of Turkey. For this chapter, 
the European Stability Initiative and particularly, United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) data is used to observe the severity of the crisis and the results of the 
cooperation with Turkey. 
 
 
6.1. Illegal Immigration Data between 2015-2019  
 
 
Migration challenges of Europe have been one of the prioritized issues of the European 
Union. Especially after 2014, the illegal immigrants were fleeing to Europe where this 
reached its peak point in 2015. Especially, the number of refugees coming to Greece was 
tremendous in which caused the Union to take action. Particularly in 2015, the number of 
arrivals in Italy was 153.843, 16.946 in Spain and 863.315 in Greece. The total number 
of number was exceeding one million in which caused an unprecedented crisis in Europe.  
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Table 6.1 Sea and Land Arrivals to Spain (UNHCR 2019) 
Sea and Land Arrivals to 
Spain 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
January 574 1.604 1.010 1.380 2.182 4.612 
February 704 673 515 1.736 1.518 1.366 
March 1.329 1.127 626 1.197 1.300 995 
April 781 1.442 930 1.198 1.690 1.539 
May 1.358 1.435 947 1.308 3.937 1.928 
June 521 1.402 1.087 2.682 7.313 2.082 
July 592 1.293 803 2.585 9.717  
August 2.288 1.332 1.589 3.100 7.022  
September 1.003 1.722 1.973 2.039 8.568  
October 984 2.227 2.032 4.099 10.912  
November 807 1.564 1.435 4.679 5.666  
December 1.096 1.125 1.658 2.373 5.558  
Total 12.037 16.946 14.605 28.376 65.383 12.522 
 
Spain is one of the frontier states of the European Union which has a maritime boundary 
to the Mediterranean. Therefore, it is one of the states affected harshly by the refugee 
flows. Comparing the EU member Mediterranean States, Spain is the least affected by 
the refugee flows in comparison to Greece and Italy. 
 
 Table 6.2 Sea and Land Arrivals to Italy (UNHCR 2019) 
Sea Arrivals to Italy 2014 2015 2016  2017 2018 2019 
January 2.171 3.528 5.273 4.467 4.182 202 
February 3.335 4.354 3.828 8.972 1.065 60 
March 5.459 2.283 9.676 10.853 1.049 262 
April 15.679 16.063 9.149 12.943 3.171 255 
May 14.599 21.235 19.957 22.993 3.963 782 
June 22.641 22.891 22.339 23.524 3.147 886 
July 24.031 23.186 23.552 11.461 1.969  
August 24.774 22.609 21.294 3.914 1.531  
September 26.107 15.922 16.975 6.291 947  
October 15.277 8.916 27.384 5.979 1.007  
November 9.295 3.218 13.581 5.645 980  
December 6.732 9.637 8.428 2.327 359  
Total 170.100 153.842 181.436 119.369 23.370 2.447 
 
Italy is another country which has a maritime border to the Mediterranean. Thus, it is one 
of the states that has been affected by the refugee flows. Followed by Greece, it is the 
second frontier state received illegal immigration flows. 
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Table 6.3 Sea Arrivals to Greece (UNHCR 2019) 
Sea and Land 
Arrivals to Greece Sea Arrivals 
Land 
Arrivals 
Total 
2014 41.038 18.014 59.052 
2015 856.723 6.592 863.315 
2016 173.450 3.784 177.234 
2017 29.718 4.907 34.625 
2018 32.494 2.280 34.774 
 
As can be seen from Table 8, Greece is the most affected country by the refugee flows 
compared to Italy and Greece. Just in one year from 2014 to 2015, the sea arrivals 
increased from 856.723 to 41.038.  
 
 
6.2. Turkey’s Contribution to the Decreased Refugee Numbers 
 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, many JHA Councils, European Council gatherings and 
attempts conducted by the Union remained insufficient. Therefore, the cooperation with 
Turkey has seen a critical solution in which led to the Joint Action Plan in 2015 and EU-
Turkey Statement in 2016. These agreements are explained in Chapter 3 in detail.  
According to the EU-Turkey Statement which was conducted in March 2016, it was stated 
that:  
 
“All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as from 
20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey. This will take place in full 
accordance with EU and international law, thus excluding any kind of 
collective expulsion (EUROPA 2016).”   
 
“For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another 
Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU taking into account the UN 
Vulnerability Criteria. A mechanism will be established, with the assistance 
of the Commission, EU agencies and other Member States, as well as the 
UNHCR, to ensure that this principle will be implemented as from the same 
day the returns start (EUROPA 2016).” 
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Therefore, while evaluating the role of Turkey, the data for Greece will be taken into 
consideration. Therefore, the illegal immigrant flows to Greece and the number of 
immigrants that were returned to Turkey is evaluated annually. Also, by the cooperation 
with Turkey, the sea arrivals to Greece declined after 2016. This was also stated in the 
Statement which was for Turkey’s role to prevent illegal immigrants fleeing to Europe: 
 
“Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes 
for illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU, and will cooperate with 
neighboring states as well as the EU to this effect (EUROPA 2016).”  
 
 
Table 6.4 Monthly Sea Arrivals to Greece Between 2014-2016 (UNHCR 2019) 
Sea Arrivals to Greece 2014 2015 
January 955 1.694 
February 1.001 2.873 
March 1.501 7.874 
April 1.257 13.556 
May 1.703 17.889 
June 3.198 31.318 
July 3.927 54.899 
August 6.742 107.843 
September 7.454 147.123 
October 7.432 211.663 
November 3.812 151.249 
December 2.056 108.742 
Total 41.038 856.723 
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Table 6.5 Monthly Sea Arrivals to Greece Between 2016-2017 (UNHCR 2019) 
Sea Arrivals to Greece 2016 2017 
January 67.415 1.393 
February 57.066 1.089 
March 29.971 1.526 
April 3.650 1.156 
May 1.721 2.110 
June 1.554 2.012 
July 1.920 2.249 
August 3.447 3.584 
September 3.080 4.886 
October 2.970 4.134 
November 1.991 3.215 
December 1.665 2.364 
Total 173.450 29.718 
 
To show the arrivals to Greece, the years between 2014 and 2017 is explained for this 
part. The reasons why these years are evaluated in together is to observe the change 
previously and after the Statement in 2016. The reason why only the sea arrivals are 
written is that the returns to Turkey are only consisted the arrivals to the Greek Islands. 
According to EU data, the illegal arrivals declined by 97% in comparison to the period 
before the Statement (EU-TURKEY STATEMENT ONE YEAR ON 2017). As it can be 
observed from Table 9, the sea arrivals decreased from 173.450 to 29.718 in which shows 
the importance of Turkey as a partner. With cooperation with Turkey, tackling with 
smugglers and refugees was easier. Referring to “One Year After the Statement” data, 
daily crossings declined to 43 from 10.000 in a day in October 2015 whereas, death at the 
Aegean Sea declined from 1,145 to 80 after the Statement (EU-TURKEY STATEMENT 
ONE YEAR ON 2017). 
 
Referring to the First Implementation Report of the Statement, it is stated that since the 
implementation; 
 
“there has been a substantial decrease in the numbers leaving Turkey for 
Greece: in the three weeks preceding the application of the EU-Turkey 
Statement to arrivals in the Greek islands, 26,878 persons arrived irregularly 
in the islands – in the three subsequent weeks 5,847 irregular arrivals took 
place (EUROPA 2016).” 
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The joint attempts conducted by both Turkish and European authorities were considered 
successful according to the report. Some of the cooperation conducted were like 14 
million Euro that was given to Turkish coastguard to secure the sea against smugglers 
and liaison officers were formed to enhance information sharing and for joint operations 
(EUROPA 2016). The Second Implementation Report was published on the 15th of June 
2016 in which emphasized on some issues. Some of the crucial ones were 20 million 
Euros that were given for the Turkish Coast Guard's search and rescue capability and the 
establishment of Coordination and Joint Risk Analysis Centre. 
 
According to the Third Report on Implementation, “In Turkey, legal developments have 
included the application of the rules on work permits which have led to the receipt of 
10,584 applications for work permits from Syrian nationals. Over 8,000 have been 
approved so far” (EUROPA 2016). This means with the cooperation of Turkey, the 
immigrants would have a legal stand to work in Turkey in which would eliminate flows 
to the European borders. Regarding the fourth report which was published on 8th 
December 2016, “The Turkish Coast Guard is actively patrolling on the Eastern Aegean 
waters, registering a high weekly level of preventions of departures from Turkey 
(EUROPA 2016)” in which indicates the importance of Tukey to prevent departures to 
tackle the migrant flows. 
 
Table 6.6 Returns from Greece to Turkey After the EU-Turkey Statement in 2016 
(UNHCR 2017) 
Returns from Greece to Turkey After the 
EU-Turkey Statement 2016 
April 386 
May 55 
June 27 
August 16 
September 94 
October 139 
November 31 
December 53 
Total 801 
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Table 6.7 Returns from Greece to Turkey After the EU-Turkey Statement in 2017 
(UNHCR 2018) 
Returns from Greece to Turkey After the EU-
Turkey Statement 2017 
January 64 
February 34 
March 45 
April 150 
May 87 
June 36 
July 60 
August 18 
September 29 
October 57 
November 75 
December 16 
Total 671 
 
As a part of the Statement, illegal immigrants would be received by Turkey. In April 
2016, 386 immigrants returned to Turkey in which the totality of this number was 801 in 
2016. Also, this number was 671 in which Turkey accepted from Greece. By the 
cooperation with Turkey, not only tackling with smugglers but also by receiving 
immigrants, Turkey was a critical partner of the European Union.  
 
The Fifth Report on the Statement which was published on 2nd of March 2017, has 
emphasized the tripartite meeting conducted in January 2017 among Greece, Turkey and 
the European Commission. The topics discussed were “Turkey and Greece to allow direct 
communication, notably on specific return operations, and to follow up on any obstacles 
identified and it has been agreed that trilateral meetings will be organised on a regular bi-
monthly basis (EUROPA 2016).” The Sixth Report was published on the 13th June 2017, 
it is also emphasized the resettlement to Turkey needs to accelerate in which the report 
stated a total number of persons waiting to resettle in Turkey is lesser than the total person 
that should be resettled to Europe in which highlighted that issue should be maintained 
(EUROPA 2016).  
 
For instance, regarding the benefits of cooperation with Turkey, it is also emphasized “the 
numbers of detections of irregular crossings at Turkey's land borders with Bulgaria and 
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Greece seem to have remained low over the past six months” in which on average five 
illegal crossings to Greece per day and two to Bulgaria per day had been detected. 
 
The last and Seventh Implementation Report as published on 6th of September 2017 
emphasized “The EU-Turkey Statement has continued to deliver concrete results in 
reducing irregular and dangerous crossings”, and for saving lives at sea and support for 
Syrian refugees (EUROPA 2017). 
 
Table 6.8 Monthly Sea Arrivals to Greece between 2018-2019 (UNHCR 2019) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.9 Returns from Greece to Turkey After the EU-Turkey Statement in 2018 
(UNHCR 2019) 
Returns from Greece to Turkey After the 
EU-Turkey Statement 2018 
January 47 
February 23 
March 29 
April 18 
May 29 
June 20 
July 23 
August 17 
September 48 
Sea Arrivals to Greece 2018 2019 
January 1.633 1.851 
February 1.256 1.486 
March 2.441 1.904 
April 3.032 1.856 
May 2.916 2.651 
June 2.439 2.510 
July 2.545  
August 3.197  
September 3.960  
October 4.073  
November 2.075  
December 2.927  
Total 32.494 12.258 
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October 17 
November 40 
December 11 
Total 322 
 
According to EU data, the illegal immigrant crossings still remained 97% lower previous 
to the Statement. The daily crossing declined to 80 in comparison to the time before the 
Statement. In addition, cooperation with Turkey, death at the Aegean Sea declined from 
1175 to 130 compared to the period before the Statement. According to Table 14, a total 
of 322 irregular immigrants were sent back to Turkey which was a decision decided by 
the EU-Turkey Statement in 2016. 
 
Table 6.10 Returns from Greece to Turkey After the EU-Turkey Statement in 2019 
(UNHCR 2019) 
Returns from Greece to Turkey After 
the EU-Turkey Statement 2019 
January 19 
February 13 
March 5 
April 10 
May 14 
Total 61 
 
According to 2019 March data of the European Union, the daily crossings decreased to 
83 compared to the period before the Statement in which the number of daily crossings 
was 10.000 in a single day. Also, the deaths in the Aegean Sea declined from 1175 to 310 
after the Statement was conducted. According to EU factsheet, this meant “almost one 
million people who have not taken dangerous routes to get to the European Union and 
more than 1,000 who have not lost their lives trying (EUROPA 2019).” In addition, since 
the beginning of 2019, the returns from Greece to Turkey has been continuing according 
to the Statement in which shows the importance of cooperation with Turkey. 
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Table 6.11 Nationality of the Returned People (UNHCR 2019) 
Nationality of the returned people 
Pakistan 714 
Syria 341 
Algeria 201 
Afghanistan 108 
Bangladesh 100 
Iraq 92 
Morocco 51 
Iran 50 
Egypt 25 
Nigeria 20 
Other 165 
 
Overall, until now 1855 irregular immigrants were sent back to Turkey from Greece under 
the EU-Turkey Statement and of those most of the immigrants were from Pakistan, 
followed by Syrian and Algerian refugees according to the Table 16. Therefore, it can be 
said that with the help of Turkey, the Union was able to control the flows that were coming 
from the sea in which joint act was taken in order to save the borders of Europe.  If there 
was not any form of cooperation for migration, this flow would go to EU member states, 
which indicates the significance of the relation between both. Thus, the numbers prove 
the importance of the cooperation with Turkey and the EU-Turkey Statement was 
inevitable where paved a way for Turkish-European relation on the basis of migration. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This thesis has looked into the migratory challenges of the European Union and Turkey’s 
role for with regards to the migration crisis of the EU which has been one of the most 
significant developments in recent years. Caused by the conflicts in the Middle East, not 
only the countries who have been going through conflicts but, the European Union 
affected by the consequences of the conflicts, either. People were trying to cross to the 
EU and because of the irregular crossings to the European borders, a new problem came 
to surface. The asylum applications to the EU in 2015 was 1.2, whereas this number was 
1.3 in 2016. Therefore, starting in 2015, irregular crossings has been a priority for the EU. 
The crisis EU has faced was unprecedented which showed the lack of migration policy 
of the Union in which was not capable enough to tackle with the migratory flows. Thus, 
the EU tried to develop new mechanisms among each other and also by cooperating with 
Turkey. 
 
The thesis examined the proposition that “Turkey and the EU has a new form of 
cooperation for migration which is shaped by Turkish policies and bargaining among the 
member states.” Therefore, the aim of the thesis was to explore whether this argument 
was true or not.  
 
The thesis looked at this proposition by using two grand theories of the European 
integration which were neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. The 
institutional framework was examined by the neofunctionalist premises whereas the 
divergent member state preferences were elaborated by the liberal intergovernmentalist 
premises. Hence, it can be said that liberal intergovernmentalism provided a better 
framework to understand different member state interests whereas evaluating the 
institutional framework was better by the neofunctionalism.  
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The findings showed that by the institutional gatherings of the Union, coming up with a 
supranational migration policy was not possible. The divergent member state interests 
caused this kind of problem. Even the EU found solutions for the migration crisis, the 
policy remained intergovernmental. Neither institutions of the Union, nor the member 
states could not come up with a coherent policy, therefore, this paved the cooperation 
with Turkey as a critical outcome. By the outcomes of the institutional decisions, a new 
role of Turkey has emerged out of this cooperation.  
 
According to the findings, Turkey has become a critical partner for tackling the migration 
crisis in which incentives were given to Turkey like the promise of membership and 
opening of new chapters, visa liberalization in addition to 3 billion Euro for its role 
controlling refugees. By the help of Turkey, EU enabled more secure borders for its 
member states in which indicated that the cooperation with Turkey was highly crucial for 
the Union. 
 
The Joint Action Plan of 2015 and the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 were critical 
junctures for the relation between the EU and Turkey regarding the migration crisis. The 
EU needed the help of Turkey whereas Turkey benefited from the incentives that were 
promised. In addition, it is possible to say the EU promised very critical incentives like 
the membership and visa liberalization.   
 
It can be said the argument of the thesis can be proven with references to the numbers. 
After the EU-Turkey Statement, there has been a dramatic decline in the irregular 
crossings in which sea arrivals to Greece were 173.450 in 2016, with the implementation 
of the statement this number decreased to 29.718. The illegal immigrant crossings lower 
than 97% comparing the period before and after the statement. This shows, with the 
cooperation of Turkey at the sea to secure the Mediterranean from refugee flows, EU and 
Turkey developed a mutual relation regarding the migration. This can be also observed 
from the progress reports of 2016 and 2018 in which cooperation regarding the Justice, 
Freedom and Security chapter was enhanced. With the help of the EU to the Turkish 
Coast Guard and DGMM, controlling and tacking the illegal crossings were easier.  
 
Overall, Turkey has become a critical partner for the security of the European Union’s 
borders. It can be said with the migration crisis, a mutual relation occurred between two 
 63 
 
in which made Turkey a very critical partner for the EU. Therefore, it is possible to say 
even there are ups and downs regarding the relationship between two actors, the 
cooperation for the migration has become inevitable. Thus, Turkey’s new role for the 
security of the Union has become on the surface.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
Turkey Progress Report 2016 Chapter 24 
 
2016 Progress 
Report 
Chapter 24: Justice, Freedom and Security 
Institutional set-
up and legal 
alignment of legal 
and irregular 
migration 
• The General Directorate for Migration Management 
(DGMM) increased its capacity and expanded its capacity 
to accommodate irregular migrants in Turkey.  
• There are 18 removal centers in which DGMM will 
construct 12 more and six more will be constructed by the 
EU funding. Also, work has been initiated on a national 
monitoring system to observe the status of refugees. 
• It is also added, Turkey needs to formulate sufficient 
capacity by the increasing the amount of stuff and by 
treating asylum seekers better. 
 
Implementation 
and enforcement 
capacity of legal 
and irregular 
migration 
• It is stated, Turkey has been a crucial transit country for 
irregular migrants. 
• Illegal crossings to Greece from Turkey fell after the EU-
Turkey Statement. The daily average of crossings fell from 
1794 (the period between January-March 2016) to 116 
(after the implementation of Statement to the end of 
September 2016). It is emphasized, this has been achieved 
by the hard work of Turkish law enforcement agencies to 
stop irregular crossings  
• However, it is stated the implementation of the 
Readmission Agreement was insufficient and. Turkey 
declared that the implementation of third-country 
provisions would not start until the EU confirms “the 
remaining visa liberalization benchmarks are fulfilled by 
Turkey”. 
• The returning of the migrants is implemented by the EU-
Turkey Statement rules, not from obligation deriving from 
the EU or bilateral readmission agreement with Greece 
• The returns were conducted by liaison officers by both 
parties, but due to the coup attempt in, Turkey withdrew its 
officers in which new officers were appointed in October. 
On the report, it is stated Turkey has been a major 
destination country for regular migrants, too. “At the end 
of 2015, 422 895 non-Turkish nationals held a temporary 
residence permit in Turkey, up from 379 804 in 2014.” 
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Institutional set-
up and legal 
alignment of 
asylum 
• DGMM applies its tasks for all asylum applications without 
discriminating their origin and the provisional branches of 
the DGMM are registering and processing the applications 
of asylum seekers. 
• The DGMM is bound to carry out international protection 
status determination and administrative procedures within 
specific timeframes. Its provincial branches registered 
asylum seekers and processed their applications.  
• A regulation was adopted that would give temporary 
protection access to the labour market to Syrians. 
• In January 2016, Turkey adopted a regulation giving Syrians 
under temporary protection access to the labour market, 
although under some conditions and limitations. In April 
2016, this regulation started to consist of all applicants of 
international protection. The applicants who received the 
protection could apply for social assistance, register to 
public schools or can be a part of the health insurance 
system. 
Implementation 
and enforcement 
capacity of the 
asylum 
• In the report, it is stated Turkey’s efforts and humanitarian 
aid is unprecedented and it has been increasing.  
• The data of refugees have stated in which most of them are 
from Syria, followed by Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and 
Somalia. 2.7 Syrian refugees are granted temporary 
protection.   
• It is also stated, 26 camps are managed by Turkish Disaster 
and Emergency Management Agency in ten cities of 
Turkey. 
• Also, the report emphasizes Turkey’s efforts to reduce the 
asylum applications by deciding on their status. On 
average, 12.000 of them are processed in a month. 
•  In April, Turkey committed to reduce the backlog of 
existing asylum applications by about 12 000 per month on 
average and to process them all by the end of 2016.  
Visa Policy • Further harmonization of visa policy is necessary for 
Turkey in which requires aligning Turkish Visa Regulation 
to the EU Visa Regulation. 
• It is stated that Turkey had applied a discriminatory visa 
regime towards 11 member states, thus, Turkey adopted a 
decree that the member states could enter Turkey when the 
visa requirement is lifted for Turkish citizens. 
• It is stated, Turkey contributed efforts to fulfill benchmarks 
of visa liberalization roadmap, but seven of them remains 
unfulfilled. 
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Institutional set-
up and legal 
alignment of 
Schengen and 
external borders 
• According to the report, some progress was achieved in 
this area and Regulation on inter-institutional cooperation 
and coordination in the field of border management was a 
step of this progress. 
• A trilateral agreement of Common Contact Centre for 
Police and Customs Cooperation between Bulgaria, Greece 
and Turkey was ratified. 
 
Implementation 
and Enforcement 
Capacity of the 
Schengen and 
external borders 
• By the new border management regulation, governors 
started to work in coordination. It is stated, the monitoring 
functions of the Border Management Implementation 
Board should be activated to observe the needs at borders.  
• It is also stated, the capacity of Turkish police to identify 
false documents should be increased to detect irregular 
crossings.  
• Another critical point from the report is that the increased 
cooperation with Greece and Bulgaria by the tripartite 
agreement.  
• Frontex operations are continuing and also increased after 
the deployment of a Frontex liaison office in Turkey. 
 
Judicial 
cooperation in 
civil and criminal 
matters 
• The Law on international judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters was adopted which covers mutual legal assistance, 
extradition, transfer of proceedings, execution of sentences 
and transfer of sentenced persons, consolidating 
international laws and regulations.  
• It is stated, in 2015 the EU accepted 56 extradition requests 
from Turkey and Turkey accepted five requests from 
member states.  
• Also, even Turkey participated in Eurojust meetings, the 
report states that the personal data protection law of Turkey 
was in line with EU regulations.  
• Regarding the judicial cooperation in civil matters, Turkey 
has ratified  1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-
operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and 
Measures for the Protection of Children and the 2007 
Hague Convention on the International Recovery on Child 
Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance but has 
not yet ratified the European Convention on the 
Compensation of Victims. 
Institutional set-
up and legal 
alignment of fight 
against organized 
crime 
• The regulation on prevention, identification, fight, 
coordination and cooperation against human trafficking 
was entered into force to prevent human trafficking among 
other duties. 
• In the report, it is stated Turkey needed to enhance its law 
on cybercrime and witness protection. 
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Implementation 
and enforcement 
capacity of the 
fight against 
organized crime 
• Cooperation agreements were signed for the fight against 
terrorism and crime to share information and to conduct 
joint operations. 
• 122 victims of human trafficking were detected in 2016 
compared with 108 in 2015 regarding the DGMM 
numbers.  
Institutional set-
up and legal 
alignment of fight 
against terrorism 
 
• On the report, it is stated that Turkey improved its rules on 
countering the financing of terrorism to line with the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations. 
But, further action is necessary for these rules to be 
standardized. 
• The Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, 
Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and 
on the Financing of Terrorism were ratified.  
• Also, it is emphasized that ECHR and ECtHR alignment 
regarding the rules on terrorism Turkey’s legislation on 
terrorism and Turkey should act in a proportional manner. 
Implementation 
and enforcement 
capacity of fight 
against terrorism 
• Counter terrorism dialogue between the EU and Turkey 
continued and it gave a specific focus on foreign terrorist 
fighters.  
• Again, the personal data protection law once more 
emphasized in which it is stated, it should be in the 
standards of the EU law.  
Cooperation in 
the field of drugs 
• It is emphasized, Turkey was successful for the seizure of 
drugs and national police of Turkey increased its capacity 
to work more systematically.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
Turkey Report 2018 Chapter 24 
 
2018 Turkey 
Report 
Chapter 24: Justice, Freedom and Security 
Institutional set-
up and legal 
alignment of legal 
and irregular 
migration 
• Overall, it is stated legislation is “partially aligned with 
the EU acquis.” 
• A strategic plan (2017-2021) was developed by DGMM 
for regular migration, irregular migration, international 
protection, the fight against trafficking in human beings, 
among other objectives 
• It is emphasized, Turkey has 18 removal centers with a 
capacity of 8 276, and it is planned to increase to 15 476 
by 2020. However, the report suggests that Turkey should 
align its act with European standards for removal centers. 
It should provide resources, staff for law enforcement 
agencies in order to label migrants and asylum seekers. 
• Bilateral readmission agreement (RA) with Montenegro 
was entered into force and another RA with Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was ready to enter into force. Other bilateral 
RAs were signed with Kosovo, Norway, Yemen and 
Nigeria, in addition to negotiations of another RA with 
Switzerland. 
• The Law on Foreigners and International Protection was 
amended by two emergency decrees. One of them stated 
that people who are considered to have a relation with 
terrorist organizations can be sent from Turkey. The other 
decree introduced “new categories of people that can 
receive short term residence permits, extended the 
duration of short term residence permits and family 
residence permits” and the categories of students that can 
have residence permits” 
Implementation 
and enforcement 
capacity of legal 
and irregular 
migration 
• Regarding the report, it is stated the Statement was 
delivering results. 
• Death at sea dropped from 434 (2016 data) to 62 (2017 
data). The daily average of irregular crossings dropped 
from 1794 (January 2016-March 2016) to 80. (2018 data) 
• It is stated, these drop offs achieved with the efforts of 
Turkish law enforcement agencies “to prevent irregular 
departures from coastal areas, the Turkish coast guard 
patrolling in the Aegean Sea, and the introduction of 
measures restricting the free movement of people seeking 
international protection and people under temporary 
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protection to the provinces to which they had been 
assigned” 
• Turkey was part of preventing the opening of a new 
migrant route in the Black Sea. 
• Also, Turkey facilitated the implementation of the ‘One-
for-One’ resettlement scheme regarding the statement. 11 
711 Syrians were resettled from Turkey to the EU 
whereas Turkey readmitted - from the 1 484 of irregular 
migrants. 
• It is stated, implementation of the EU-Turkey 
readmission agreement was not sufficient. Still,  Turkey 
did not implement the provisions in relation to third-
country nationals.  
• The new work permit system the ‘Turquoise Card’ was 
introduced, to able to make work force to stay in Turkey.  
Institutional set-
up and legal 
alignment of 
asylum 
• It is stated, “Turkey’s asylum legislation is partially 
aligned with the EU acquis.” 
• According to an amendment to the Law on Turkish 
Citizenship, naturalization of 36.323 Syrian refugees was 
accepted and approximately 50.000 of them were 
identified for naturalization.  
• In the report, it is stated applicants for international 
protection and people under temporary protection could 
apply for a work permit. 15.700 work permits were granted 
to Syrians. 
• It is stated, a dual asylum system is applied to non-Syrian 
asylum seekers. They must apply for Newcomers must 
apply for asylum at a DGMM Provincial Directorate of 
Migration Management office (PDMM). 
Implementation 
and enforcement 
capacity of the 
asylum 
• According to 2017 data, there are 3.5 million Syrian and 
365000 non Syrian refugees in Turkey. 
• Approximately 228 000 of the 3.5 million Syrian refugees 
are stationed in 21 camps directed by the Disaster and 
Emergency Management Agency (AFAD). 
• With the EU support under the Facility for Refugees in 
Turkey, access to schooling and healthcare for Syrians 
were enhanced. 
• It is also emphasized in the report that more information 
should be provided to migrants and refugees about their 
rights. 
• According to the report, seekers continued to increase in 
Turkey. Until March 2018, Turkey granted international 
protection to 69.614 applicants and did not accept 13.079 
applications, and 251. 574 cases were under review.  
• A new registration center was decided to build in Ankara 
elaborating and processing 25 000 applications per year.  
• Also, DGMM started to cooperate with the European 
Asylum Support Office in 2017. 
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Visa Policy • According to the report, Turkey needed to harmonize its 
visa policy in line with the EU common visa policy.  
• Still, Turkey continues to apply a discriminatory visa 
policy to eleven Member States. 
• There has been some progress for biometric passports to 
be in line with EU law. 
• Turkey needed to fulfill 7 remaining benchmarks which 
were the fight against corruption, judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, cooperation with Europol, data 
protection legislation, anti-terrorism legislation, EU-
Turkey readmission agreement, and biometric passports 
in which Turkey planned an outline and sent to the 
Commission how to fulfill those benchmarks.  
• 13 training courses were thought for border and consular 
officials. 
Institutional set-
up and legal 
alignment of 
Schengen and 
external borders 
• Turkey is not fully aligned with the legislative and 
administrative of the Schengen and external borders. 
• A joint law enforcement training academy for the 
gendarmerie and the coast guard was initiated. 
• It is stated that for being in line with EU law, professional 
staff should be located for border check and border 
surveillance tasks. Also, risk analysis units needed to be 
initiated. 
Implementation 
and Enforcement 
Capacity of the 
Schengen and 
external borders 
• The March 2016 Regulation on Inter-institutional 
Cooperation and Coordination in the field of Border 
Management should be implemented. It is stated that The 
Integrated Border Management Coordination Board has 
not yet reached the level it should have been.  
• The National Coordination and Joint Risk Analysis 
Centre (NACORAC) should start to function. 
• Also, it is added governors received the required training 
and the Ministry of the Interior adopted a training 
manual. 
• The responsibility for managing pre-arrival information 
and conducting risk analysis on passenger traveling by air 
was given to DGMM.  
• It is also suggested that passenger information data 
should be shared and analyzed by the Turkish police to 
manage risk. 
• It is stated, The Turkish police’s capacity to identify 
forged and falsified documents need to be more effective 
and the police need to deploy more professional staff. 
• Operational cooperation among the European Border and 
Coast Guard Agency and Turkey was accelerated.  
Judicial 
cooperation in 
civil and criminal 
matters 
• The Law on International Judicial Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters entered into force in May 2016. 
•  There is a criticism towards independence and 
accountability of the justice system in which it should be 
enhanced 
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• Also, an agreement could not have been concluded to the 
lack of Turkish law on data protection. 
• Turkey was part of four Eurojust cases which were about 
terrorism, illegal immigrant smuggling, money 
laundering and fraud.  
• Turkey signed the 1983 European Convention on the 
Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes. 
Institutional set-
up and legal 
alignment of fight 
against organized 
crime 
• It is emphasized, Turkey increased the number of 
departments in the police and the gendarmerie to 
tackleorganized crime like drugs, migration, human 
trafficking, cybercrime, witness protection. 
• It is stated that Turkish law for the fight against organized 
crime and police cooperation is partially in line with the 
EU law.  
 
Implementation 
and enforcement 
capacity of the 
fight against 
organized crime 
• An agreement could not be signed with Europol since EU 
and Turkish law is not in line regarding the data 
protection requirements. 
• The Commission recommendation was about starting 
negotiations of an international agreement which would 
allow for the exchange of personal data including. 
• Cooperation between the European Union Agency for 
Law Enforcement Training and the Turkish police 
Academy continued in which Turkey signed 51 
cooperation agreements with 21 member states to the 
fight against terrorism and crime. 
Institutional set-
up and legal 
alignment of fight 
against terrorism 
 
• Turkey aligned its legislation with the provisions of 
Following the Council of Europe’s Convention on 
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the 
Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism. 
• Turkey’s law on terrorism and its implementation should 
be in line with the European Convention on Human 
Rights, the European Court of Human Rights case-law 
and the EU acquis and practices  
• The proportionality principle is emphasized for Turkish 
activities. 
Implementation 
and enforcement 
capacity of fight 
against terrorism 
• It is stated that counter-terrorism dialogue between 
Turkey and the EU continued with a focus on foreign 
terrorist fighters.  
• But, police and judicial cooperation with member states 
and EU agencies were limited because of the 
insufficiency of personal data protection law.  
Institutional set-
up and legal 
alignment of 
cooperation in the 
field of drugs 
• In November 2017, a research committee was initiated to 
do research on drug addiction. 
• The High Council for the Fight against Drugs was tasked 
with high-level strategy development, developing 
coordination and monitoring strategy implementation. 
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Implementation 
and enforcement 
capacity of 
cooperation in the 
field of drugs 
• It is stated law-enforcement body of Turkey conducted 
the successful operation. 
•  Also, it is added the quality and quantity of data 
provided by Turkey is enhancing. 
 
